Showing posts with label Hamas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamas. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 6, 2014
Monday, February 16, 2009
The truth about Hamas
Hamas discourages Palestinians from seeking treatment in Israel
Original article
by Anav Silverman
Published: 02.16.09, 12:34 / Israel Opinion
One of the most frequently reported items in the Arab-Israeli conflict today are the crossings between Gaza and Israel. As the only way for cargo, aid, and other goods to enter and leave Gaza, these crossings are essential to the livelihood of the 1.4 milion Palestinians who live in the Gaza Strip.
Ten minutes away from Sderot, sits the Erez Crossing - the only crossing that serves as a pedestrian exit point for Gaza Strip residents entering Israel. The crossing is open to Palestinian workers holding permits and families seeking medical treatment in Israel. Large numbers of journalists and international foreign press also pass through the point.
I recently had the opportunity to visit the Erez crossing where the first site that greeted me was a brand new medical center, which had been opened at the start of the unilateral ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in mid-January. Israel's Magen David Adom ambulance service, in cooperation with the Israeli Department of Health, opened the center to treat wounded Gazans, with the Israeli government investing millions of dollars into its construction.
The new Israeli medical center can handle 30 patients per hour and is staffed by paramedics and doctors who specialize in emergency medicine, pediatrics, trauma, gynecology, orthopedics, and other fields. It is equipped with state of the art laboratories, X-ray machines, and a pharmacy.
"The only problem," said Shlomo Tzaban, a manager at the Erez Crossing, "is that the medical center stands empty. No one is using it because Hamas discourages Palestinians from seeking treatment at Israeli hospitals."
Before entering Erez, Palestinians must first pass through a checkpoint on the Gaza side. Hamas controls that point on the Gaza end and therefore has complete authority on Palestinians seeking to enter Israel. Subsequently, there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of Palestinians seeking medical treatment in Israel - down to 80-90% - says Tzaban.
"Everyone in Gaza lives under Hamas control," explains Tzaban. "Hamas uses terror and fear to rule the Palestinian people.” Tzaban uses the judicial system in Gaza as an example.
Back in December 2008, the Hamas parliament sanctioned that Palestinian courts were to condemn offenders according to violent punitive measures under Islamic Sharia laws. Hamas punishments for Palestinian offenders include whipping, severing hands (for stealing,) crucifixion and hanging.
Tzaban, a 28-year old veteran of the IDF, emphasizes that Hamas will use any means now to win support of the Palestinians after the heavy damages inflicted by the war. "The fact that Hamas police recently raided an UNRWA storehouse in order to distribute the humanitarian aid on its own accord may shock the international community but it's happened before," says Tzaban.
"In order to maintain the support of the Palestinian civilian population, Hamas is trying to show that only their regime has the power to provide for the welfare of the Palestinian people, while simultaneously waging war against Israel.”
Terrorists target crossings
The United Nations Relief and Work Agency accused Hamas of seizing humanitarian aid sent into Gaza from countries across the world on February 4. UNRWA stated that Hamas had seized thousands of blankets and hundreds of food packages that were meant to be delivered to hundreds of poor families in Gaza after UNRWA refused to hand over the humanitarian aid to the Hamas Ministry of Social Welfare.
Today, the Erez compound stands practically empty, except for a couple of Palestinian families and foreign journalists, and two peace activists standing outside. The compound was built five years ago and was meant to check through around 20,000-25,000 Palestinian workers at a time.
Although the opening of the crossings is essential to the Gaza economy, Palestinian terror networks have frequently attacked the Erez crossing. “On average, there are between two to four attempted Palestinian terrorist attacks on the Erez compound each month,” according to Erez, an IDF security officer at the checkpoint.
In the last four years, Palestinian terror networks have targeted the Erez crossing with almost 500 mortar shells. In May 2008, a Palestinian bomber from Gaza blew up an explosive-laden truck on the Palestinian side of the Erez crossing, causing an estimated $3.5 million in damages to the Israeli checkpoint.
Along with the Erez crossing, the three other crossings between Gaza and Israel include Karnei, Kerem Shalom and Nahal Oz. Initially, the crossing points were part of the Gaza security buffer facilitated under Yitzchak Rabin’s 1994 Oslo Accords. A wave of Palestinian suicide bombers had flooded into Israel and the security buffer was built as a means to prevent the entrance of such terrorists, which it was successfully able to do.
Once Palestinian terror groups recognized that suicide bombers could no longer enter Israel, they began developing rockets and explosives, intensely targeting Israeli communities bordering Gaza and the closest Israeli city to Gaza-Sderot, as well as the crossings themselves.
At this point, most of the crossings are considered closed, although the transfer of humanitarian aid into the Strip continues through the Karni, Kerem Shalom, and Nahal Oz crossings. Israel plans to fully open the crossings only when Hamas releases Gilad Shalit, the IDF soldier kidnapped at the Kerem Shalom border crossing almost three years ago.
Original article
by Anav Silverman
Published: 02.16.09, 12:34 / Israel Opinion
One of the most frequently reported items in the Arab-Israeli conflict today are the crossings between Gaza and Israel. As the only way for cargo, aid, and other goods to enter and leave Gaza, these crossings are essential to the livelihood of the 1.4 milion Palestinians who live in the Gaza Strip.
Ten minutes away from Sderot, sits the Erez Crossing - the only crossing that serves as a pedestrian exit point for Gaza Strip residents entering Israel. The crossing is open to Palestinian workers holding permits and families seeking medical treatment in Israel. Large numbers of journalists and international foreign press also pass through the point.
I recently had the opportunity to visit the Erez crossing where the first site that greeted me was a brand new medical center, which had been opened at the start of the unilateral ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in mid-January. Israel's Magen David Adom ambulance service, in cooperation with the Israeli Department of Health, opened the center to treat wounded Gazans, with the Israeli government investing millions of dollars into its construction.
The new Israeli medical center can handle 30 patients per hour and is staffed by paramedics and doctors who specialize in emergency medicine, pediatrics, trauma, gynecology, orthopedics, and other fields. It is equipped with state of the art laboratories, X-ray machines, and a pharmacy.
"The only problem," said Shlomo Tzaban, a manager at the Erez Crossing, "is that the medical center stands empty. No one is using it because Hamas discourages Palestinians from seeking treatment at Israeli hospitals."
Before entering Erez, Palestinians must first pass through a checkpoint on the Gaza side. Hamas controls that point on the Gaza end and therefore has complete authority on Palestinians seeking to enter Israel. Subsequently, there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of Palestinians seeking medical treatment in Israel - down to 80-90% - says Tzaban.
"Everyone in Gaza lives under Hamas control," explains Tzaban. "Hamas uses terror and fear to rule the Palestinian people.” Tzaban uses the judicial system in Gaza as an example.
Back in December 2008, the Hamas parliament sanctioned that Palestinian courts were to condemn offenders according to violent punitive measures under Islamic Sharia laws. Hamas punishments for Palestinian offenders include whipping, severing hands (for stealing,) crucifixion and hanging.
Tzaban, a 28-year old veteran of the IDF, emphasizes that Hamas will use any means now to win support of the Palestinians after the heavy damages inflicted by the war. "The fact that Hamas police recently raided an UNRWA storehouse in order to distribute the humanitarian aid on its own accord may shock the international community but it's happened before," says Tzaban.
"In order to maintain the support of the Palestinian civilian population, Hamas is trying to show that only their regime has the power to provide for the welfare of the Palestinian people, while simultaneously waging war against Israel.”
Terrorists target crossings
The United Nations Relief and Work Agency accused Hamas of seizing humanitarian aid sent into Gaza from countries across the world on February 4. UNRWA stated that Hamas had seized thousands of blankets and hundreds of food packages that were meant to be delivered to hundreds of poor families in Gaza after UNRWA refused to hand over the humanitarian aid to the Hamas Ministry of Social Welfare.
Today, the Erez compound stands practically empty, except for a couple of Palestinian families and foreign journalists, and two peace activists standing outside. The compound was built five years ago and was meant to check through around 20,000-25,000 Palestinian workers at a time.
Although the opening of the crossings is essential to the Gaza economy, Palestinian terror networks have frequently attacked the Erez crossing. “On average, there are between two to four attempted Palestinian terrorist attacks on the Erez compound each month,” according to Erez, an IDF security officer at the checkpoint.
In the last four years, Palestinian terror networks have targeted the Erez crossing with almost 500 mortar shells. In May 2008, a Palestinian bomber from Gaza blew up an explosive-laden truck on the Palestinian side of the Erez crossing, causing an estimated $3.5 million in damages to the Israeli checkpoint.
Along with the Erez crossing, the three other crossings between Gaza and Israel include Karnei, Kerem Shalom and Nahal Oz. Initially, the crossing points were part of the Gaza security buffer facilitated under Yitzchak Rabin’s 1994 Oslo Accords. A wave of Palestinian suicide bombers had flooded into Israel and the security buffer was built as a means to prevent the entrance of such terrorists, which it was successfully able to do.
Once Palestinian terror groups recognized that suicide bombers could no longer enter Israel, they began developing rockets and explosives, intensely targeting Israeli communities bordering Gaza and the closest Israeli city to Gaza-Sderot, as well as the crossings themselves.
At this point, most of the crossings are considered closed, although the transfer of humanitarian aid into the Strip continues through the Karni, Kerem Shalom, and Nahal Oz crossings. Israel plans to fully open the crossings only when Hamas releases Gilad Shalit, the IDF soldier kidnapped at the Kerem Shalom border crossing almost three years ago.
Monday, February 9, 2009
The Robbing of Gaza
Original article
By Joseph Klein
FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, February 09, 2009
In a rare admission of Hamas’ wrong-doing, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”) promptly condemned Hamas in a sternly worded press release for seizing its humanitarian supplies by force on February 3, 2009. For once, UNRWA did not deem it necessary, in the name of moral equivalency, to attack Israel at the same time.
The UN Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson Marie Okabe reinforced UNRWA’s condemnation of Hamas by essentially paraphrasing its press release at a briefing held on February 4th at UN headquarters that I attended. I looked around at other peoples’ faces in the briefing room and some appeared as surprised as I was that, for the first time, we were witnessing UNRWA and the Secretary General’s office actually criticizing Hamas alone in such strong terms. However, the matter-of-factness with which the Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson read her statement – as opposed to the anger we always hear from UN spokespersons whenever Israel is criticized – conveyed a rather nonchalant attitude toward the whole thing as if it were an unfortunate but isolated event. Of course it is anything but.
The incident that brought this development about involved the confiscation of over 3500 blankets and 406 food parcels by police affiliated with Hamas, who broke into an UNRWA warehouse in the Shatti beach refugee camp and seized the aid supplies by force. The supplies were to be distributed by UNRWA to five hundred families in Gaza. The confiscation took place after UNRWA staff had earlier refused to accede to Hamas’ demand and hand over the aid supplies to the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs. The reason for the refusal, UNRWA said, was to ensure that the assistance would actually reach the intended beneficiaries.
At the request of reporters attending Ms. Okabe's briefing, a follow-up press conference was set up at UN headquarters via video link the next day with John Ging, UNRWA’s Director of Operations in Gaza. Ging acknowledged that Hamas's seizure of UNRWA aid supplies was only making matters worse, saying that the incident had “crossed a red line”. However, he blamed it on "the reckless acts of a few", as if the ruling Hamas terrorist group were a reasonable organization that had temporarily lost control of a few hotheads. Ironically, not long after Ging was briefing reporters about the first incident, Hamas struck again. It seized 10 truckloads of flour and rice that had been delivered into Gaza, leading UNRWA to suspend all further aid shipments into Gaza until the Hamas government returns the stolen supplies and provides credible assurances that such thefts will end.
Just days before Hamas’ criminal seizure of UNRWA supplies, the United Nations had launched an international appeal for $613 million to help in Gaza recovery efforts. "With the help of this $613 million appeal, the United Nations and other aid agencies can jump into action to help the 1.4 million civilians in the Gaza Strip to recover," Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a news conference on the situation in Gaza, speaking from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Unfortunately, the Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson was either unable or unwilling to acknowledge a connection between Hamas’ forceful assertion of control over the disposition of UNRWA aid supplies and concern over what Hamas would be likely to do in order to get its hands on the UN-raised Gaza aid money. She ducked a question at the press briefing on this very point.
The concern is not hypothetical. Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip and Syria have warned the international community against channeling funds intended for Gaza reconstruction projects through the Palestinian Authority. "Don't give the money to Ramallah," said Moussa Abu Marzouk, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau.
Hamas wants total control over all aid – supplies and money - in order to enhance its claims to legitimacy and to bestow favors to its supporters in Gaza while depriving its enemies of any assistance.
Hamas has no interest in relieving the suffering of the civilians under its rule. In fact, Hamas prevented its own people from reaching lsraeli medical facilities set up just outside Gaza. It has regularly intercepted humanitarian convoys and stolen food items that had been donated for free distribution to needy Gazans. Instead, they were sold in the black market. After using Palestinian civilians as human shields during the conflict with Israel, Hamas is now stealing aid intended for suffering women and children whose images Hamas wants to continue using for propaganda purposes.
A Fatah official denounced Hamas last month as a "black and bloody militia" that was responsible for the "catastrophe" in the Gaza Strip, as reported in the Jerusalem Post. This was a Palestinian speaking, not an Israeli citizen. The Fatah official, who wished to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal, would like to see Hamas leaders Mahmoud Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh tried before a Palestinian court as "war criminals." The Hamas leaders, he charged, were responsible for the death of hundreds of innocent Palestinians. "Ever since they came to power, they brought death and destruction to our people."[1]
When Hamas’ Palestinian brethren can connect the dots and see through Hamas’ exploitation of its own people, it is time for the United Nations to consider Hamas’ criminal seizure of UNRWA aid supplies as a wake-up call. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon must do everything possible to ensure that not a cent of money the UN raises for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Gaza goes to Hamas or to any of its front organizations. Otherwise, it will not be long before the Secretary General’s spokesperson may have to read a statement during a press briefing about Hamas’ theft of hundreds of millions of dollars from the Palestinian people.
Notes:
[1] The Jerusalem Post (January 12, 2009)
_________________________________________________
Joseph A. Klein is the author of Global Deception: The UN’s Stealth Assault on America’s Freedom.
By Joseph Klein
FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, February 09, 2009
In a rare admission of Hamas’ wrong-doing, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”) promptly condemned Hamas in a sternly worded press release for seizing its humanitarian supplies by force on February 3, 2009. For once, UNRWA did not deem it necessary, in the name of moral equivalency, to attack Israel at the same time.
The UN Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson Marie Okabe reinforced UNRWA’s condemnation of Hamas by essentially paraphrasing its press release at a briefing held on February 4th at UN headquarters that I attended. I looked around at other peoples’ faces in the briefing room and some appeared as surprised as I was that, for the first time, we were witnessing UNRWA and the Secretary General’s office actually criticizing Hamas alone in such strong terms. However, the matter-of-factness with which the Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson read her statement – as opposed to the anger we always hear from UN spokespersons whenever Israel is criticized – conveyed a rather nonchalant attitude toward the whole thing as if it were an unfortunate but isolated event. Of course it is anything but.
The incident that brought this development about involved the confiscation of over 3500 blankets and 406 food parcels by police affiliated with Hamas, who broke into an UNRWA warehouse in the Shatti beach refugee camp and seized the aid supplies by force. The supplies were to be distributed by UNRWA to five hundred families in Gaza. The confiscation took place after UNRWA staff had earlier refused to accede to Hamas’ demand and hand over the aid supplies to the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs. The reason for the refusal, UNRWA said, was to ensure that the assistance would actually reach the intended beneficiaries.
At the request of reporters attending Ms. Okabe's briefing, a follow-up press conference was set up at UN headquarters via video link the next day with John Ging, UNRWA’s Director of Operations in Gaza. Ging acknowledged that Hamas's seizure of UNRWA aid supplies was only making matters worse, saying that the incident had “crossed a red line”. However, he blamed it on "the reckless acts of a few", as if the ruling Hamas terrorist group were a reasonable organization that had temporarily lost control of a few hotheads. Ironically, not long after Ging was briefing reporters about the first incident, Hamas struck again. It seized 10 truckloads of flour and rice that had been delivered into Gaza, leading UNRWA to suspend all further aid shipments into Gaza until the Hamas government returns the stolen supplies and provides credible assurances that such thefts will end.
Just days before Hamas’ criminal seizure of UNRWA supplies, the United Nations had launched an international appeal for $613 million to help in Gaza recovery efforts. "With the help of this $613 million appeal, the United Nations and other aid agencies can jump into action to help the 1.4 million civilians in the Gaza Strip to recover," Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a news conference on the situation in Gaza, speaking from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Unfortunately, the Secretary General’s deputy spokesperson was either unable or unwilling to acknowledge a connection between Hamas’ forceful assertion of control over the disposition of UNRWA aid supplies and concern over what Hamas would be likely to do in order to get its hands on the UN-raised Gaza aid money. She ducked a question at the press briefing on this very point.
The concern is not hypothetical. Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip and Syria have warned the international community against channeling funds intended for Gaza reconstruction projects through the Palestinian Authority. "Don't give the money to Ramallah," said Moussa Abu Marzouk, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau.
Hamas wants total control over all aid – supplies and money - in order to enhance its claims to legitimacy and to bestow favors to its supporters in Gaza while depriving its enemies of any assistance.
Hamas has no interest in relieving the suffering of the civilians under its rule. In fact, Hamas prevented its own people from reaching lsraeli medical facilities set up just outside Gaza. It has regularly intercepted humanitarian convoys and stolen food items that had been donated for free distribution to needy Gazans. Instead, they were sold in the black market. After using Palestinian civilians as human shields during the conflict with Israel, Hamas is now stealing aid intended for suffering women and children whose images Hamas wants to continue using for propaganda purposes.
A Fatah official denounced Hamas last month as a "black and bloody militia" that was responsible for the "catastrophe" in the Gaza Strip, as reported in the Jerusalem Post. This was a Palestinian speaking, not an Israeli citizen. The Fatah official, who wished to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal, would like to see Hamas leaders Mahmoud Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh tried before a Palestinian court as "war criminals." The Hamas leaders, he charged, were responsible for the death of hundreds of innocent Palestinians. "Ever since they came to power, they brought death and destruction to our people."[1]
When Hamas’ Palestinian brethren can connect the dots and see through Hamas’ exploitation of its own people, it is time for the United Nations to consider Hamas’ criminal seizure of UNRWA aid supplies as a wake-up call. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon must do everything possible to ensure that not a cent of money the UN raises for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Gaza goes to Hamas or to any of its front organizations. Otherwise, it will not be long before the Secretary General’s spokesperson may have to read a statement during a press briefing about Hamas’ theft of hundreds of millions of dollars from the Palestinian people.
Notes:
[1] The Jerusalem Post (January 12, 2009)
_________________________________________________
Joseph A. Klein is the author of Global Deception: The UN’s Stealth Assault on America’s Freedom.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
UNRWA suspends Gaza aid after Hamas steals food and supplies
Original article
By Haaretz Service and The Associated Press
Last update - 17:27 06/02/2009
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) on Friday said it is suspending humanitarian aid in Gaza until further notice, after Hamas seized control of its warehouses and stole 200 tons of food and supplies.
The agency said it made the decision after Hamas personnel seized an aid shipment on Thursday. Earlier this week, Hamas police took thousands of blankets and food parcels meant for needy residents.
In a statement, UNRWA said 10 truckloads of flour and rice that had been
d
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elivered into Gaza on Thursday were taken away by trucks affiliated with the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs. Earlier this week, Hamas police took thousands of blankets and food parcels meant for needy residents.\
UNRWA said the suspension would remain in effect until the aid is returned and the agency receives credible assurances from the Hamas government that such thefts will end. There was no immediate reaction from Hamas.
UNRWA spokesman Chris Gunness said the agency would continue to distribute aid from its existing supplies in Gaza, but that stocks were running thin.
"There is enough aid for days, not weeks," he said. Complicating the situation, he said the agency has not been able to import plastic bags used for food distribution, and that existing supplies will run out early next week.
Some 80 percent of Gaza's 1.4 million people rely on the UN agency for food and other support, and UN officials say the need for aid has increased since Israel ended a military offensive in Gaza last month.
A UN spokesman on Wednesday said Hamas police in Gaza broke into a warehouse full of UN humanitarian supplies and seized thousands of blankets and food packages, creating a rare public clash between the international agency that feeds much of the territory and the militant group that rules it.
The incident highlighted difficulties facing donors seeking to bypass Hamas while helping Gazans survive and rebuild after Israel's three-week military offensive.
"Hamas policemen stormed into an aid warehouse in Gaza City Tuesday evening and confiscated 3,500 blankets and over 400 food parcels ready for distribution to 500 families," said UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness on Wednesday.
"They were armed, they seized this, they took it by force," Gunness said, terming the incident absolutely unacceptable.
Police seized the aid after UNRWA officials refused to voluntarily hand it over to the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs, he said. Similar aid packages were distributed to 70,000 residents over the past two weeks, Gunness said.
Ahmad Kurd, the Hamas official in charge of the ministry, did not deny the aid was seized. Other Hamas officials defended their actions.
Hamas spokesman Taher Nunu demanded an apology and said UNRWA was spreading false news. Ihab Ghussein, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry, said the incident occurred because the UN was storing the blankets in an area not authorized to be distributed.
In Gaza, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum called UNRWA's decision unjustified.
He said Hamas supports UNRWA's work, but believes that some of the agency's employees were giving aid to groups attached to rival political parties.
"We as Hamas refuse all use of the people's needs for political ends," he said. "He called on UNRWA to put an end to using aid for political means, and to distribute it to all the needy equally."
UN officials said the aid was kept in a local storage facility because the organization's regular warehouses were full. The UN, human rights groups and Palestinians have often complained that a blockade by Israel and Egypt has left Gaza critically short of vital supplies.
Gaza residents are facing more hardship since Israel's devastating three-week military offensive, which ended Jan. 18. The operation, aimed at halting rocket fire by Palestinian militants, killed 1,300 including hundreds of civilians and left thousands destitute after their homes were damaged or destroyed.
Kurd said the Hamas government had already distributed $50 million in emergency relief to residents and promised additional payments for hardship cases.
Gunness said this was the first time Hamas seized UNRWA supplies. "Does anyone really think that the Americans, who are our single largest donor, or the Europeans, who are our largest multination donor, would give us aid in the generous way they do if they thought that aid would go to terrorists?" Gunness asked.
The West Bank-based government of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a fierce rival of Hamas, was also planning to send $600 million in aid, hoping to earn the loyalty of Gaza residents. Hamas expelled forces loyal to Abbas when it overran Gaza in 2007.
Egypt is to host an international conference in coordination with Abbas's Palestinian Authority on March 2 on Gaza reconstruction, whose cost has been estimated at $2 billion. Saudi Arabia has said it would donate e1 billion.
Last week, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit urged Europe to help with fast aid for the Gaza Strip, saying the reconstruction meeting would require damage assessments and the support of the European Union, the United Nations and others.
By Haaretz Service and The Associated Press
Last update - 17:27 06/02/2009
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) on Friday said it is suspending humanitarian aid in Gaza until further notice, after Hamas seized control of its warehouses and stole 200 tons of food and supplies.
The agency said it made the decision after Hamas personnel seized an aid shipment on Thursday. Earlier this week, Hamas police took thousands of blankets and food parcels meant for needy residents.
In a statement, UNRWA said 10 truckloads of flour and rice that had been
d
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elivered into Gaza on Thursday were taken away by trucks affiliated with the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs. Earlier this week, Hamas police took thousands of blankets and food parcels meant for needy residents.\
UNRWA said the suspension would remain in effect until the aid is returned and the agency receives credible assurances from the Hamas government that such thefts will end. There was no immediate reaction from Hamas.
UNRWA spokesman Chris Gunness said the agency would continue to distribute aid from its existing supplies in Gaza, but that stocks were running thin.
"There is enough aid for days, not weeks," he said. Complicating the situation, he said the agency has not been able to import plastic bags used for food distribution, and that existing supplies will run out early next week.
Some 80 percent of Gaza's 1.4 million people rely on the UN agency for food and other support, and UN officials say the need for aid has increased since Israel ended a military offensive in Gaza last month.
A UN spokesman on Wednesday said Hamas police in Gaza broke into a warehouse full of UN humanitarian supplies and seized thousands of blankets and food packages, creating a rare public clash between the international agency that feeds much of the territory and the militant group that rules it.
The incident highlighted difficulties facing donors seeking to bypass Hamas while helping Gazans survive and rebuild after Israel's three-week military offensive.
"Hamas policemen stormed into an aid warehouse in Gaza City Tuesday evening and confiscated 3,500 blankets and over 400 food parcels ready for distribution to 500 families," said UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness on Wednesday.
"They were armed, they seized this, they took it by force," Gunness said, terming the incident absolutely unacceptable.
Police seized the aid after UNRWA officials refused to voluntarily hand it over to the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Affairs, he said. Similar aid packages were distributed to 70,000 residents over the past two weeks, Gunness said.
Ahmad Kurd, the Hamas official in charge of the ministry, did not deny the aid was seized. Other Hamas officials defended their actions.
Hamas spokesman Taher Nunu demanded an apology and said UNRWA was spreading false news. Ihab Ghussein, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry, said the incident occurred because the UN was storing the blankets in an area not authorized to be distributed.
In Gaza, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum called UNRWA's decision unjustified.
He said Hamas supports UNRWA's work, but believes that some of the agency's employees were giving aid to groups attached to rival political parties.
"We as Hamas refuse all use of the people's needs for political ends," he said. "He called on UNRWA to put an end to using aid for political means, and to distribute it to all the needy equally."
UN officials said the aid was kept in a local storage facility because the organization's regular warehouses were full. The UN, human rights groups and Palestinians have often complained that a blockade by Israel and Egypt has left Gaza critically short of vital supplies.
Gaza residents are facing more hardship since Israel's devastating three-week military offensive, which ended Jan. 18. The operation, aimed at halting rocket fire by Palestinian militants, killed 1,300 including hundreds of civilians and left thousands destitute after their homes were damaged or destroyed.
Kurd said the Hamas government had already distributed $50 million in emergency relief to residents and promised additional payments for hardship cases.
Gunness said this was the first time Hamas seized UNRWA supplies. "Does anyone really think that the Americans, who are our single largest donor, or the Europeans, who are our largest multination donor, would give us aid in the generous way they do if they thought that aid would go to terrorists?" Gunness asked.
The West Bank-based government of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a fierce rival of Hamas, was also planning to send $600 million in aid, hoping to earn the loyalty of Gaza residents. Hamas expelled forces loyal to Abbas when it overran Gaza in 2007.
Egypt is to host an international conference in coordination with Abbas's Palestinian Authority on March 2 on Gaza reconstruction, whose cost has been estimated at $2 billion. Saudi Arabia has said it would donate e1 billion.
Last week, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit urged Europe to help with fast aid for the Gaza Strip, saying the reconstruction meeting would require damage assessments and the support of the European Union, the United Nations and others.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Sunday, February 1, 2009
The Fatah Option
Original article
By Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs | Friday, January 30, 2009
Israel's three-week military operation in Gaza in December-January has raised the issue of the possible return of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party to Gaza to replace the Hamas regime. The Israelis, Americans, the major European powers, and especially the Egyptians favor Abbas' forces regaining control not only over Gaza's border crossings, but also over the entire Strip. However, international demands for Fatah's return to Gaza face seemingly intractable obstacles.
A previous U.S.-funded and armed Fatah security regime in Gaza had entirely failed. Years of massive corruption and gangsterism by Fatah security forces resulted in an Iranian-financed, armed and trained Islamic emirate ruled by Hamas. Abbas had had the full backing of the international community to turn Gaza into the Hong Kong of the Middle East. Instead, Fatah collapsed under a Hamas assault in summer 2007.
Currently, the U.S.-sponsored Fatah forces in the West Bank are still ill-prepared for the task of taking control in Gaza. Two modest paramilitary forces have been trained to police crime and enforce public order, but not to uproot terror groups. In fact, the PA has increasingly offered safe haven to terror groups. Brig.-Gen. Radhi Assida, the PA National Security Forces (NSF) commander in Jenin, revealed to the Palestinian website Maan on January 24, 2009, that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's NSF had agreed to provide protection to four senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists wanted by Israel. Assida also confirmed that PIJ operatives continue to receive monthly salaries from the PA Interior Ministry, just like their colleagues in the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.1 Furthermore, thousands of Fatah security operatives in Gaza and the West Bank have realigned their loyalties away from Abbas and Fayyad. Other armed militias are currently less active or dormant but remain armed and intact. Some local militia commanders continue mafia-like criminal enterprises while simultaneously working as local commanders in PA security forces, thereby continuing to undermine public trust.
In post-war Gaza, Fatah forces would face a wall of opposition from Hamas and many other Jihadi groups. Hamas' military leadership remains intact, as do most of its terror capabilities. Hamas continues to enjoy popular support from a majority of Palestinians, particularly those living in Gaza, despite public anger over the war. Fatah will be hard-pressed to re-take the Gaza Strip because the party has lost credibility among Palestinians, largely because of its failure to reform itself and get rid of icons of corruption among the top brass.2
International Calls for Fatah's Return to Gaza
Israel's military campaign to destroy the Hamas army and terror infrastructure in Gaza triggered broad international efforts to implement a cease-fire that would include the return of Palestinian Authority forces to Gaza. The international community appears determined to help stop weapons smuggling into Gaza and reopen the Gaza border crossings to Egypt and Israel and restore a Gaza-West Bank link.3
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is backing the return of Abbas' forces to the crossings in line with the U.S.-brokered 2005 border crossing agreements.4 He hosted the major European powers at Sharm al-Sheik on January 18, 2009, immediately following the Gaza cease-fire, to discuss new security measures to stop Hamas weapons smuggling beneath the Egyptian-Gaza border and to secure the flow of humanitarian aid via the crossings.
The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1860 that explicitly called for restoring the 2005 Gaza crossing agreement between the PA and Israel and affirming Gaza as an integral part of PA-controlled territory.5 Abbas traveled to the UN in New York to support the resolution.6 PA officials in the West Bank also indicated a readiness to send forces to Gaza, but noted, "It depends on whether Israel manages to get rid of the Hamas regime."7 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the UN Security Council that stabilizing Gaza will "require a principled resolution of the political challenges in Gaza that reestablishes ultimately the Palestinian Authority's legitimate control and facilitates the normal operation of all crossings."8 President Barak Obama has called for the reopening of the Gaza border crossings, while making his first overseas phone call to a foreign leader to PA Chairman Abbas to express support.9
Which "Fatah Forces" are Jerusalem, Washington, and Cairo Counting On?
The convergence of opposition to Hamas in Washington, Cairo, Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Ramallah could serve as a pretext for regime change in Gaza. However, international hopes for such a change may be premature since the PA's security forces do not constitute a single, professional, experienced and disciplined military organization under a centralized chain of command. Rather, Fatah security forces are divided into several paramilitary groups in the West Bank and Gaza, some more reformed and effective than others.
Since Oslo, Fatah's multiple security forces constitute several militias that were originally established and commanded by Yasser Arafat, who employed Palestinian "graduates" of Israeli prisons and others who lacked any formal police or security training.10 Today, however, some of the PA forces are far more professional, having been equipped and trained by U.S. security officials in Jordan.11 PA National Security Forces report to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, while Mahmoud Abbas controls the Presidential Guard, a smaller force that protects the Abbas regime and functions as a police force. However, these forces are still in their infancy. They have less than one year's experience, number fewer than 1,500 men, and lack a chief of staff and an overall "top-down" central command structure. Fayyad's NSF has not yet demonstrated the ability or will to uproot both active and dormant terror groups and militias.12
In Gaza, Fatah retains a residual, yet completely decentralized, force infrastructure of competing security militias that are not loyal to Abbas but to local leaders, militia commanders, and crime families.13
One of the problems in creating a robust PA military force large enough to reassert control in Gaza is that Palestinian commanders do not automatically enjoy the loyalty of their soldiers. Palestinian allegiances are invariably influenced by Arab cultural affiliations to clan, family, town, neighborhood, and political group. Many Palestinian NSF officers have family members and close relatives that are employed by competing security organizations or armed militias, which makes all-out armed confrontation highly unlikely. That explains in part the Fatah collapse in June 2007, as its forces were unable to confront their brothers, cousins, and uncles in Hamas.
Fatah Forces in Gaza
In Gaza, tens of thousands of former Fatah security personnel and activists maintain loyalties to various former PA security forces and commanders, such as the deposed former strongman Mohammed Dahlan. Some former Fatah security personnel have found employment with the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Hamas and local crime families such as the Dughmush and al-Samhadana clans, and local al-Qaeda-inspired Salafist groups such as Jaish al-Islam, Fatah al-Islam, and Jaish al-Umma. The Fatah umbrella in Gaza also includes a number of smaller militias such as the Abu Rish Brigades, which had broken away from Fatah's Preventive Security forces.
Some of the fourteen competing security organizations Arafat had established after the signing of the Oslo agreements were disbanded in 2005 under the direction of the U.S. Special Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, who moved to enforce Quartet Roadmap reforms. However, the unofficial militias have never been uprooted or disbanded. Instead, militia members froze their activities by agreement with the PA in exchange for compensation from the PA and clemency from Israel. Some local militia group commanders were even integrated into the "reformed" security forces under U.S. supervision, as ranking officers, while they continued to extort and threaten local businessmen.14
In 2009, thousands of "unemployed" Fatah militiamen, such as members of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, still hold weapons that they conceal in their homes. In their current dormant status, they also continue to receive monthly salaries from the Palestinian Authority on the instructions of Abbas and Fayyad,15 who are eager to avoid conflict with these groups and to protect themselves from the death threats made by the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas against them.16
Hamas Threatens, Fatah Pays
The enmity between Fatah and Hamas is far greater than Palestinian hatred of Israel.17 Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, described Hamas as "insects" in the final week of Israel's offensive in Gaza.18 Hamas legislator Salah Bardaweel countered that PA Chairman Abbas "played a major role" in the Israeli killing of Hamas Interior Minister Said Siam "through his men in the Gaza Strip, who have been pointing out the homes of Hamas members."19 However, what is remarkable and ignored in Western diplomatic circles is that Fayyad has continued to pay the monthly salaries of between 6,000 and 12,000 Hamas Executive Force operatives in Gaza, in line with the 2007 Mecca national unity agreement that brought Hamas under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority for budgetary purposes.20
It is widely believed in Western diplomatic circles that the PA in Ramallah was only paying the salaries of civil service employees in Gaza to encourage them to stay at home to avoid working with Hamas, especially after Hamas' expulsion of Fatah in June 2007. This is incorrect. The PA, and indirectly the U.S., and international donor countries have continued to pay monthly salaries to Hamas security operatives (Read: terrorists) and their commanders from the PA's $120 million monthly budget allocation to the Gaza Strip.21 The height of irony in this regard may have been seen during the Gaza war when Hamas fighters received their salaries from the PA at Gaza City's Shifa Hospital which was immune from IDF fire.22
Understanding the Hidden Complexities of the Fatah Security Forces
The prospective return of any Fatah security forces to Gaza must take into account the complexities of the many competing centers of Fatah power, as well their implications within the context of Palestinian political culture. For the past 16 years, U.S., European, and Israeli policy-makers have lavished billions of dollars on "strong" leaders like Arafat, or actively sought to strengthen "weak" leaders like Abbas, without assessing the effect of these policies on the internal Palestinian political discussion.23 For example, the PA received $3 billion in 2008, according to French estimates,24 while the December 2007 Paris donor's conference committed to transfer over $7 billion in aid to the PA over the years 2008-2010.25 Yet the Palestinian public still sees U.S.-led international assistance as a virtual "payoff" to a corrupt government and security forces in exchange for PA cooperation.
After years of unsuccessful Western-backed PA security regimes, since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, and through the Annapolis agreement in 2008, the Palestinian street is largely convinced that U.S. backing of the PA has sanctified brutality, state-approved "gangsterism," and corruption in the name of stopping radicals and advancing the peace process. Palestinian public cynicism translated into Hamas' landslide parliamentary victory in 2006 and its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007. This analysis, then, may serve as a basis for careful reconsideration of past misassumptions about Fatah's security capabilities and help clarify current security realities in Gaza.
Back to Square One? The Return of Mohammed Dahlan
Former PA Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan, who had headed the U.S.-backed Fatah Preventive Security force in Gaza until Hamas routed his forces in June 2007, has re-emerged as a leading candidate to command Fatah's security forces, particularly to secure the Gaza crossing points into Egypt and Israel. Despite Hamas' bloody thrashing of Dahlan's forces, his prospective return to Gaza reportedly aroused the interest of former Secretary of State Rice.26 Palestinian and Egyptian leaders have also been interested in Dahlan's reassertion of control.27 While Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak reportedly told PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad that, "For me, Dahlan does not exist,"28 current circumstances would point to his involvement in any new PA security force in Gaza.
Dahlan appears to have emerged from retirement to his Cairo villa where he had kept a low profile since the Hamas takeover. However, he has of late given many interviews on Egyptian and Saudi media outlets, blasting Hamas' deep connection to Iran while making thinly veiled suggestions as to his potential role in rebuilding Gaza.29 It is no coincidence that the Egyptians and Saudis are providing Dahlan a platform to condemn Hamas. Cairo and Riyadh quietly backed the Israeli operation in Gaza and had backed Dahlan's forces with some $20 million before the 2007 coup.30
Although Dahlan lost many men and even his home to Hamas, he continues to enjoy the backing of several thousand armed Fatah activists who have remained in Gaza under Hamas rule. A major motivating factor behind Dahlan's possible return is the billions of dollars in international aid that have been promised to finance reconstruction efforts. Dahlan had built his personal fortune by being Fatah's key man in Gaza between 1996 and 2007.31 Perhaps most significantly, Dahlan may be the only Palestinian leader unfazed by threats of revenge by other Palestinian groups.32
Reports of U.S. interest in Dahlan's re-involvement in Gaza follow nearly twelve years of close coordination with the United States. He had been a long-time favorite of the Clinton and Bush administrations and was praised as a reformer during the Oslo years for publicly criticizing Arafat's dictatorship and calling for Palestinian security reforms.33 Starting in 1996, President Clinton approved intensive CIA and FBI backing of Dahlan's Preventive Security forces and other PA security organs.34
Dahlan's relationships with Washington were top-tier.35 He referred to Bill Clinton as "a friend." Dahlan was also embraced by lawmakers and senior security officials alike.36 A senior member of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence told the authors in 2005 that Dahlan was "charming." Dahlan too understood the importance of his U.S. partners. In early 2008 Dahlan said of CIA Director George Tenet, "He is simply a great and fair man."37 President George W. Bush also met with Dahlan on several occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as "a good, solid leader" and reportedly called him "our guy" to advisors behind closed doors.38
Reviving a Failed Security Paradigm?
A key question is whether Dahlan's possible return essentially revives a failed strategy. Until Dahlan's forces collapsed before Hamas, the U.S. had placed its full weight behind him, investing at least $56 million in the PA security infrastructure at the Karni crossing39 where General Dayton had invested much of his time before the Hamas coup.40 The U.S. had also backed a high-risk, covert State Department plan code-named "Plan B,"41 that was drafted jointly by U.S., Jordanian, and PA officials, that called for Dahlan's Fatah forces to overthrow Hamas in Gaza and reassert control.42 While the White House vigorously denied any such designs, the plan was widely known among senior Fatah officials.43
Dayton, though listed as a key figure in the Dahlan project, would later deny any material involvement with the plan.44 However, he testified before Congress on May 23, 2007, just weeks before the Fatah collapse in Gaza, saying, "the $3 million assistance package to the (Palestinian) Office of National Security ensures that the U.S. Security Coordinator has a strong and capable partner as we proceed with Palestinian security sector transformation and our focus on a smaller but more capable Palestinian security force, operating under the rule of law and with respect for human rights."45 Yet Dayton's security program was roundly criticized by senior Israeli defense officials as "a complete failure."46
It is widely recognized in Palestinian circles that at the time of the Hamas coup, Dahlan's Fatah force simply refused to fight. Fewer than 10,000 armed Hamas men managed to defeat 70,000 U.S.-backed Fatah loyalists. It is also no secret among Palestinians that Dahlan was shuttling between Cairo and Germany for "medical treatment" for bad knees during the fighting, despite having been paid handsomely for his security efforts.47 Hamas did not have to work hard to repel a Fatah takeover attempt. Hamas operatives recruited Fatah family members to convince their relatives in uniform to surrender without fighting.
The Gaza debacle was a setback for Dahlan. The extent of his personal fortune - amassed during the time when he cooperated closely with Washington on the peace process - may not be well known by the incoming U.S. administration. Palestinian documents captured in the IDF's 2002 Defensive Shield operation revealed Dahlan's involvement in major racketeering, including revenues from cigarettes, cement, and the collection of illegal crossing fees.48 He was also known as a partner in the smuggling networks involving the Rafah border tunnels, together with the al-Samhadana crime family.
Ironically, even prior to 2007, U.S. security officials had not been deterred by Dahlan's actions and reputation on the Palestinian street. He had been a key architect of the 2005 border crossing agreements that he designed with U.S. Secretary of State Rice, but which fell apart after Hamas violence drove European monitors to abandon their posts. Glenn Kessler noted in his 2007 biography of Rice that in the 2005 Gaza crossing agreements, "Rice focused especially on Mohammed Dahlan, the Palestinian Authority's civil affairs minister, but in effect Fatah's boss in Gaza, because Abbas would never agree to a deal unless Dahlan gave his approval."49 Dahlan had controlled the security and economic aspects of the Karni and Rafah crossing points, where at least 750 truckloads of goods and 1,000 Palestinians passed daily including many Hamas leaders that were on Israel's "wanted" list.50 Costly import licenses and crossing permits were all in the hands of Dahlan's people and are widely believed to have generated millions of dollars in profits.
A former senior World Bank official had estimated Dahlan's personal wealth at well over $120 million as of mid-2005, just before Israel's disengagement from Gaza.51 Dahlan's personal fortune is a notable achievement, since most of his life has been spent in and around Gaza refugee camps, Israeli prisons, and Fatah security installations.
Palestinian Impatience with Dahlan
Gazans and West Bankers have been less forgiving than the U.S. of Dahlan's record. The former Gaza strongman's reputation for brutality, extortion, and corruption precedes him. Torture of Hamas and other opponents in Gaza by Dahlan loyalists have even been documented on "YouTube."52 Fatah websites implicated him, together with the Gaza-based Dughmush clan, in the 2005 murder of General Musa Arafat, Fatah's former head of Military Intelligence and National Security forces in Gaza.53 The Palestinian street had branded Dahlan "the CIA" for years, ever since the U.S. agency had provided him a black bullet-proof SUV.
No less troubling for Israel is the fact that years of CIA and Israeli Security Agency coordination did not prevent Dahlan's alleged complicity in ordering a deadly terror attack against an Israeli school bus in Gaza on November 18, 2000, that killed two adults and severely wounded three children from the Cohen family who were former Gush Katif residents.54
Mahmoud Abbas' PA Presidential Guard
While the United States, Egypt, and Western countries have mentioned the possible return to Gaza of PA forces loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, his direct authority and influence has been limited to the Ramallah-based Presidential Guard - a modest 1,500-man armed force. The Presidential Guard is tasked with protecting the PA Chairman and the Fatah regime but not foiling terror attacks, or uprooting militias in the West Bank. Even with dedicated security forces that continue to undergo U.S.-sponsored training at bases near Jericho in line with the Roadmap security reform program, Abbas rarely ventures out of Ramallah.
The dangers to Abbas posed by various terror groups, militias, warlords, and gangs have prevented him from visiting most Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank, let alone refugee camps, earning him the reputation on the Palestinian street of being "the Mayor of Ramallah." The Presidential Guard's record in Gaza is mixed. They were among the first to surrender to Hamas in June 2007, and subsequently were not officially disbanded but became dormant, as opposed to their West Bank counterparts that were retrained and resupplied by U.S. military advisors under General Dayton.55
Salam Fayyad's Palestinian National Security Forces
The Palestinian National Security Forces that are funded by and report to the office of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are the most likely security command that could be deployed to Gaza in the framework of a cease-fire agreement. The NSF was restructured following the 2007 defeat by Hamas. Secretary of State Rice worked closely with General Dayton and Fayyad to retrofit a verifiably reformed Palestinian force in line with the Annapolis peace process framework of a shelf agreement between Israel and the PA that would come to fruition if and when the PA would be capable of fulfilling its security requirements under the first stage of the Quartet Roadmap. The U.S. provided $86 million in July 2007 to train 1,100 recruits, while another $75 million was earmarked for a national security installation under construction near Jericho.56
The NSF's motivation to succeed stems from the Fatah leadership's fear of a Hamas takeover in the West Bank. The NSF's initial successes in several West Bank cities, including Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem, have restored a certain sense of public security to local residents, as well as attracting thousands of Israeli Arabs to shop in Jenin and Nablus which has helped jumpstart the West Bank economy.
Since its first deployment in May 2008, the NSF - which Hamas has branded "the Dayton forces" - has forcefully confronted Hamas supporters in the West Bank. The NSF has also closed down some Hamas charities in public displays of force, while redirecting Hamas charity money to PA coffers. PA security forces have also arrested Hamas activists and have reduced threatening activity in Hamas-controlled mosques. The readiness of the NSF to confront Hamas publicly is unprecedented; Arafat had avoided confronting Hamas, while Fayyad is doing so.
Despite intensive U.S. and Palestinian efforts to maximize performance, there still remains a large question mark over whether these forces possess the ability and will to take more aggressive action against terror groups and armed gangs in the West Bank, and whether they stand a chance of successfully redeploying to Gaza. General Dayton admitted in a December 2008 interview that the NSF "is not the Israel Defense Forces. They are orienting their efforts totally on the lawless elements within Palestinian society...so that Palestinian families can walk down the streets at night and not be intimidated or threatened by either criminals or men with guns."57
Some Israel Defense Forces senior commanders agree with Dayton. In fact, IDF Central Command has been highly critical of the U.S.-backed PA forces, insisting that PA forces in the West Bank cities are not combating terrorists, while warning that "terrorist organizations in Nablus, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were cooperating in their attempts to perpetrate terror attacks against Israel, and building an underground tunnel system in Nablus."58 According to a senior IDF official, "There is no doubt that the moment the IDF leaves this territory, the Palestinians will have a rocket capability in the West Bank."59
Fatah's Rejection of Fayyad: A Roadblock to Gaza
The PA's NSF is funded by and reports to the office of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. His office and the PA Interior Ministry vet candidates and pay salaries, while Mahmoud Abbas is not directly involved with the NSF. This is significant because U.S. and European efforts to implement a Gaza cease-fire have included discussion of the return of PA security forces to Gaza that are "loyal to Abbas." Yet the U.S.-backed post-Gaza security reform concept was to create a non-Fatah professional army. However, other than an initial round of recruited commanders who were not from Fatah, subsequent officer recruits were mostly affiliated with Fatah. This reflects Fayyad's own problematic political status in the PA areas. He is not a Fatah member and receives no political backing from the Fatah power structure.
Moreover, Fayyad's lack of grassroots support handicaps his ability to maintain control and loyalty of commanders and forces in the field, which would only be exacerbated should Fatah seek a return to Gaza. This is significant because Fayyad's close cooperation with the United States, the West, and Israel must also translate to implementation on the ground. While Fayyad is probably the most impressive professional Palestinian statesman the U.S. and the West have ever worked with, Palestinian elites and the public essentially view Fayyad as a de facto American agent. While Abbas has also cooperated closely with Israel, the U.S., and the West, and has also received death threats on Hamas and Fatah terror group websites, his status as Fatah royalty protects him from opponents and maintains his political base.
Senior Fatah advisors and former ministers close to Abbas have been critical of the U.S. decision to place the PA's major security force in the hands of Fayyad. The Fatah central committee even voted in Ramallah in November 2008 to compel Abbas to remove Fayyad from being in charge of the NSF and to replace with him with a Fatah member. In late January 2009, Fayyad offered to resign his post following accusations by Fatah that Fayyad was an obstacle to reconciliation with Hamas.60
Dormant Terror Groups: The Hidden Threat to the West Bank and Gaza
Hamas is not the only major threat to Fayyad's forces in the West Bank. There are multiple armed terror groups and militias that have temporarily kept a low profile. However, they are capable of undermining the entire PA security regime. Despite reports in early 2008 by Fayyad's office that militias such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank had been dismantled, it turned out that Fayyad had essentially agreed to a mutually advantageous modus vivendi with these groups. Gunmen have agreed to hide their weapons, and Fayyad has agreed to "hide" operatives on Israel's target list in PA jails under a "revolving door" policy allowing freedom of entry and exit, which had created serious concern among senior IDF commanders.61 Fayyad also reached agreement with Israel on a general clemency program for some militia members in exchange for their commitment to cease all terror activity against Israel.62 However, senior IDF commanders have also expressed related concerns that since the NSF deployment, "weapons provided by the U.S. to the PA are finding their way to Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin as well as in Nablus."63 Abbas also had expended great efforts to incorporate the Islamic terrorist organizations into the Palestinian government.64
Another major concern of the IDF senior command has been that local terror militias, such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, have also been integrated into local NSF units. Such militia leaders include Abu Jaber, an infamous local gang leader in Nablus who is also a NSF commander, who regularly extorts Nablus business owners for protection money.65
Gaza: From "Hamastan" to "Fatahland"
While the West sees the PA's Abbas and Fayyad as the only legitimate Palestinian address, the issue is far more complex within the Palestinian political discussion. Abbas is seen by the Palestinian street as "done," incapable of delivering peace or anything of value to the Palestinians.66 Despite Palestinian anger at Hamas for causing the recent IDF incursion, many Palestinians, including elites and even traditional Fatah allies, still see Hamas as democratically legitimate since it won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Hamas appears to be more popular than ever among the Palestinians residents of Gaza. In mid-December 2008, some 250,000 Palestinians took to the streets to celebrate Hamas' 21st anniversary.67
Abbas is likely to face substantial roadblocks to reestablishing Fatah control or coming to a modus vivendi with Hamas. Fatah-Hamas tensions are at a high point. Hamas and much of the Gazan public are convinced that Abbas supplied Israel with intelligence and other operational information to use to destroy the Hamas terror infrastructure. As Palestinian analyst Mohammed Yaghi noted, "Hamas even accused Nimir Hamad, Abbas' political adviser, of calling Israeli defense official Amos Gilad and advising him to target Hamas operators and installations only."68 In fact, since the outset of Israel's military operation in Gaza, Fatah members there have been rounded up and brutally tortured by Hamas operatives, who have turned school buildings and hospitals into make-shift interrogation centers.69 Hamas also renewed house arrest orders against Fatah officials and activists in Gaza shortly after the military operation started. Since the cease-fire, Hamas has stolen international relief shipments, even hijacking international aid trucks to prevent Fatah from taking any credit in the eyes of the Palestinians.
Hamas no longer recognizes the presidential authority of Mahmoud Abbas after his four-year term ended on January 9, 2009, although Abbas has decided to remain in office, based on his reading of Palestinian law.70 More importantly, the Hamas leadership is still intact. The IDF estimates that 400 to 700 Hamas operatives were killed in the Gaza operation.71 That leaves most of Hamas' 15,000-man army and 10,000-man police force in place, including Izaddine al-Kassam, the Hamas Executive Force, and internal security forces. A significant quantity of Hamas weapons and ammunition remains hidden. Furthermore, during and after the IDF operation, Hamas continued to smuggle weapons and contraband via underground tunnels from Sinai to Gaza.
Hamas is not concerned about a tactical reconciliation with Fatah. Several scenarios can serve Hamas interests. Hamas may agree to a Fatah-Hamas national "reconciliation" government for tactical reasons, as it did in 2007, to gain international recognition, benefit from the billions of dollars of international aid, and rebuild their offensive capabilities against Israel using the Fatah-led PA as a fig leaf. At the same time, Hamas will again subvert Fatah control on the ground.
Alternatively, Hamas may return to its more natural role as the agent of muqawama (Islamic armed resistance) while reengaging Fatah forces in another round of civil war, which has killed hundreds of Palestinians since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. The armed strife intensified after the Palestinian national unity government was brokered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in February 2007 and lasted until the Hamas takeover in June of that year.
Hamas is not the only opposition force that Abbas will face. Fatah's armed wing, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, announced on January 19, 2009, that its men in Gaza fought against Israel alongside Hamas, together with Islamic Jihad's Al-Quds Battalions. The Al Aksa Brigades said they fired 102 rockets and 35 mortars, and detonated explosive devices that wounded a number of IDF soldiers.72
The U.S. and European Role in Securing and Rebuilding Gaza
Frenetic Western diplomatic efforts have been focused on rebuilding Gaza under the control of the PA's West Bank leadership as a prelude to a final settlement. Washington and European powers have already committed several billion dollars to Gaza's reconstruction. They are anxious for a final settlement, and European leaders led by French President Nicholas Sarkozy are reportedly even willing to recognize Hamas in the context of a Fatah-Hamas unity government.73 Special UN envoy Tony Blair has also expressed his support for the idea.74 However, the current realities in Gaza may frustrate Western diplomatic plans.
It is far from clear that under current conditions any constellation of Fatah forces could successfully restore stability in Gaza, hope for Gazans, and long-term security for Israel. Despite the important yet limited security and economic reforms PA Prime Minister Fayyad has undertaken in the West Bank, the Palestinian public, both in Gaza and the West Bank, are far from confident that Fatah is anything but an incorrigibly corrupt and brutal regime that continues to be rewarded with billions of dollars from the U.S., Europe, and Israel. Since the cease-fire, some senior Fatah leaders have allegedly moved quickly to set up "straw" construction and contracting firms in the hope that the estimated $2.5 billion earmarked for rebuilding Gaza will be funneled through the PA and its privileged elites in Ramallah.75 Indeed, the Fatah-led P.A. will need to do much confidence-building to earn the trust of the Palestinian public.
The United States and the West must avoid the temptation of once again blindly relying on Fatah as the sole security and reconstruction subcontractor for Gaza. The Obama administration must implement tough and verifiable directives to facilitate internal Palestinian housecleaning: no militias, good governance, complete accountability, full transparency, effectiveness, and zero tolerance for corruption, gangsterism, and terror within PA ranks in Gaza and the West Bank. These steps are critical for the future of the Palestinian project and take immediate precedence over current negotiations with Israel.76
At the same time, U.S.-backed security efforts in the West Bank will need to be upgraded to ensure the complete cessation of all direct and indirect militia involvement on the ground or as part of the current NSF security regime. Only a decision to uproot the active and dormant militias and armed groups will ensure stability and enable the socioeconomic, "bottom-up" infrastructure-building that special envoy Tony Blair has worked diligently to develop in advance of renewed diplomacy.77
Any new Fatah-related security regime and government in Gaza that receives U.S. and Western financial support must also be required to submit to unprecedented oversight of rebuilding efforts, in order to implement missing financial controls and adopt "best-practice" standards. Corrupt and brutal warlords, gangs, and militias must no longer be allowed to undermine the Palestinian national project while they remain protected, privileged and empowered by the U.S.-backed Palestinian Authority.
_______________________________________________
Notes
1. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
2. Fatah officials in the West Bank are also demoralized. Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, told a British reporter that the "Hamas are insects" and noted that the Palestinians would likely not see a Palestinian state in his lifetime. Qadura Fares, a senior Fatah official, said that the PA would not succeed either in the West Bank or Gaza without "tackling the privileges of the Fatah elite, who, he said, "have become like princes" with regard to personal wealth, referring to rampant Fatah corruption. David Rose, "In the Smart West Bank Health Club, Between Jogging and Swimming Laps, People Were Screaming ‘Death to Israel'," Mail on Sunday, January 17, 2009.
3. French President Nicholas Sarkozy said: "We have pledged to help Israel and Egypt with all the technical, military, naval and diplomatic ways to help end the smuggling of weapons into Gaza," http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1056208.html. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown also offered to send British naval vessels to battle smuggling, http://www.wtop.com/?nid=105&sid=1577726.
4. Mona Salem, "Egypt Rejects Calls to Open Border with War-Battered Gaza," AFP, December 30, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081230/wl_mideast_afp/ mideastconflictgazaegyptborder_081230191014.
5. For the full text of UNSC Resolution 1860, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9567.doc.htm.
6. Barak Ravid, "Egypt's Truce Plan: Cease-fire Followed by Border Security Talks," Ha'aretz, January 7, 2009.
7. Khaled Abu Toameh, "PA Ready to Take Gaza if Hamas Ousted," Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2008.
8. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009/01/113629.htm. President Bush also called for international monitors in a radio speech on January 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090102-3.html.
9. Natasha Mozgovaya, "Obama.: We will Aggressively Seek Middle East Peace," Ha'aretz, January 23, 2009. See also Roni Sofer, "Obama Calls Abbas, Olmert on First Day," Ynet, January 21, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3659961,00.html.
10. Khaled Abu Toameh and Dan Diker, "What Happened to Reform of the Palestinian Authority?," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 3, 2004, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp? DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=701.
11. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different," Interview with U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1228728164523& pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
12. Senior officials close to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas confirmed the lack of a Palestinian chief of staff and a disciplined, centralized command structure in several meetings with author Dan Diker in 2008, most recently in Tel Aviv, December 8, 2008. Also, the authors draw a distinction between the Palestinian National Security Forces' success in confronting Hamas activists in Ramallah and closing down Hamas charities, and the PA security forces' lack of will to uproot Hamas and other terror groups. This has been common to PA control in Gaza and the West Bank and had characterized PA security force failures in the 1990s. Other less active, yet competing, Fatah militias include PA Preventative Security under the command of Ziad Hab al-Rih, a Fatah operative and former colleague of former West Bank Fatah strongman Jibril Rajoub. There are also other smaller Fatah-affiliated armed groups.
13. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat and the Battle for the Spoils of Gaza," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 10, 2005, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=542
14. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies," Front Page Magazine, October 18, 2005. In a more recent example, local Nablus warlord Abu Jabber was integrated in Fayyad's National Security Forces in 2008 as a mid-level commander, but this did not stop his local militia from continuing to extort local business owners for protection money. One local real estate developer related to the authors that Abu Jabber had demanded an apartment for free in exchange for his militias' forced protection services. This same phenomenon - national security by day and mafia member by night - has characterized the PA Fatah forces in the West Bank from Arafat's entry into the territories in 1994 until today under the Dayton reform plan outlined at Annapolis. American security programs under the Clinton administration had ended up training numerous PA terror operatives such as Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades terrorist Khaled Abu Nijmeh, who had used his CIA training to supervise multiple suicide bombings in Bethlehem in 2001 and 2002. A July 2005 report compiled by the security consulting firm Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI) on behalf of the U.S. government found that, "even with millions of American dollars and years of CIA training, the PA police were wholly ineffective, wracked with divided loyalties and inferior equipment." SAI charged that "many of the PA officers were active or complicit in terrorist attacks or organized crime rings." See Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
15. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
16. For example, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades websites have called for the murder of Fayyad since 2003, while Hamas' Izaddine al-Kassam Brigades website called Abbas "a murderer" for his actions against Hamas operatives and "justified exercising the use of divine justice against him, relying on religious decrees that permit the killing of a Muslim who collaborates in a crime against another Muslim." See Lt.-Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "The Hamas Regime in the Gaza Strip: An Iranian Satellite that Threatens Regional Stability," in Iran's Race for Regional Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, p.76.
17. Reports from Gaza indicate that hundreds of Fatah members were killed and tortured by Hamas during and after Israel's military campaign in Gaza. See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," January 19, 2009. Fatah and Hamas websites reveal the bitter hatred and enmity between the groups that will not be solved if the groups agree for tactical reasons to enter into a national unity government. This is frequently misunderstood in the West, which believes that a Fatah-Hamas "reconciliation" - like the one brokered in Mecca in 2007 and which resulted in more deaths between Fatah and Hamas than in previous years - would be a pretext for advancing the peace process. A senior advisor to French President Nicholas Sarkozy told Ha'aretz that a Fatah-Hamas national unity government would trigger EU acceptance of Hamas as a governmental partner to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
18. Dan Diker, "A Deterrent Restored," Powerlineblog, January 9, 2009, http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2009/01/022505.php.
19. Khaled Abu Toameh Hamas: Abbas' Spies Led Israel to Siam," Jerusalem Post, January 17, 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ ShowFull&cid=1232100169312.
20. http://www.janes.com/security/law_enforcement/news/jdw/jdw070115_1_n.shtml. A high-ranking official at a senior Palestinian ministry confirmed PA monthly salary payments to Hamas' Executive Force in Gaza and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades in the West Bank, in a meeting with the authors in Jerusalem, December 7, 2008.
21. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to ‘Steal' Gaza Funds," Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2009.
22. Amir Mizroch, "Hamas Salaries Paid at Shifa Hospital," Jerusalem Post, January 12, 2009.
23. See the strategic assessment by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon on the error of Israeli and Western backing of "strong" and "weak" Palestinian leaders in "Israel and the Palestinians; a New Strategy," op. cit.
24. "French Envoy, Palestinians Given $3B in Foreign Aid in 2008," AP/Ha'aretz, December 23, 2008.
25. Elaine Sciolino, "$7.4 Billion Pledged for Palestinians," New York Times, December 18, 2007, as cited in Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians."
26. According to a conversation with a senior Israeli security official, January 13, 2009.
27. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Shuns Bid to Give Rafah to PA," Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2009. Dahlan's candidacy to reassert Fatah control in Gaza was confirmed by senior PA officials in a meeting with author Dan Diker on December 8, 2009. Two Arab diplomats familiar with negotiations over an Israeli-Hamas cease-fire also confirmed his candidacy in separate conversations with Diker on January 6 and January 11, 2009. Hamas leaders have also pointed to Dahlan's possible return. A Hamas official in Gaza City claimed that former Fatah security commanders who fled Gaza during the Hamas takeover in June 2007, including Mohammed Dahlan and his deputy Rashid Abu Shabak, "were holding meetings in Cairo and Ramallah to discuss returning home." See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: PA Conspiring with Israel," Jerusalem Post, December 31, 2008.
28.According to a senior source in the Bureau of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, January 12, 2009.
29. Mohammed Dahlan interview, Egyptian State Television, January 21, 2009.
30. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, April 2008.
31. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat," op. cit. Dahlan was believed to be a local partner in the UK Portland Trust plan to develop hundreds of low-cost housing units in post-disengagement Gaza.
32. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Analysis: A Viable Successor to Hamas Is Hard to Find," Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2009. Ramadan Shallah, secretary-general of Islamic Jihad, warned that any Palestinian "who dares to return to the Gaza Strip aboard an Israeli tank would be condemned as a traitor." Senior Arab diplomats told author Dan Diker on January 9, 2009, that Dahlan is not concerned with Palestinian threats against him.
33. Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
34. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
35. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
36. A senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee told author Dan Diker that Dahlan was "very charming" at a meeting on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., June 2005.
37. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. A former State Department employee familiar with the concept and planning of what was called "Plan B" to replace Hamas with Dahlan's forces confirmed the plan to the author in an off-the-record interview, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2008. See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different," op. cit.
40. Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
41. See a copy of the note reportedly left in a meeting in Ramallah between PA and U.S. officials, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_PlanB0804.pdf. See a copy of the pre-"Plan B" U.S. security plan from 2006 left behind at a meeting between U.S. and Palestinian officials in Ramallah, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_Walles0804.pdf.
42. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell." See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
43. Former PA Interior Minister and senior Abbas advisor Hanni al-Hassan shared his sharp criticism of the plan with the author in a meeting several days after the coup on June 17, 2007.
44. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State," Ha'aretz, August 14, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009578.html.
45. "Remarks by U.S. Security Coordinator, LTG Keith Dayton, Update on the Israeli-Palestinian Situation and Palestinian Assistance Programs," House Foreign Affairs, Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, May 23, 2007, www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/day052307.htm.
46. Yaakov Katz, "Israeli Official: Dayton Failed," Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2007.
47. According to Hanni al-Hassan, former senior advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, in a meeting with the author, June 17, 2007. Hani al-Hassan, former senior political advisor and member of Fatah's central committee, said in an Al-Jazeera TV interview on June 27, 2007, that what was happening in Gaza was not a Hamas defeat of Fatah but defeat of plans of American Major General Keith Dayton, Mohammed Dahlan and his Fatah followers. See http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3418486,00.html. See the Al-Jazeera interview at http://uk.truveo.com/Hani-AlHassan-of-the-Fatah-Executive-Committee/id/517194181. David Wurmser, former Middle East Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, would later note, "It looks to me that what happened wasn't so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen." See David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
48. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
49. Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, Condoleezza Rice and the Bush Legacy (New York: St. Martins Press, 2007), p. 133.
50. Erica Silverman, "Two Steps Back," Al-Ahram Weekly, December 8-14, 2005.
51. Dan Diker meeting with former senior World Bank official, Jerusalem, July 2005.
52. David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
53. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
54. According to Haggai Huberman writing in Hatzofe, the former Sharon government had been provided a secret CIA tape recording of Dahlan ordering the attack.
55. For many months in 2008 Abbas and Fayyad did not speak, coordinate positions, or cooperate. More recent reports indicate that their working relationship has slightly improved. They are essentially leaders of two separate Palestinian Authorities. Fayyad is the U.S. contact, while Abbas is the leader of the Fatah establishment and has been a source of disappointment to the Bush administration. See Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, p. 130. This point was also reiterated at a series of meetings in 2008 with a senior advisor to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas based in Ramallah.
56. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State."
57. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different."
58. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror," Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1212659734963&pagename= JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
59. Ibid.
60.. Mohammed Abu Khadair, "Dr. Fayyad Places His Government at the Disposal of the President to Pave the Way for National Reconciliation," Al Quds, January 23, 2009.
61. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
62. Isabel Kirshner, "Volatile City Tests Palestinian Police and Peace Hopes," International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/14/africa/14nablus.php.
63. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
64. Moshe Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
65. A Nablus businessman told author Dan Diker of the direct threats made against him by local Nablus Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades commander Abu Jabber, in a meeting in Rome, December 9, 2009.
66. Steve Erlanger, "On Palestinian Question, Tough Choices for Obama," New York Times, January 22, 2009.
67. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas and the Palestinians," Hudson New York, January 2, 2009.
68. Mohammed Yaghi, "The Impact of the Gaza Conflict on Palestinian Politics," Policy Watch, No. 1446, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 31, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2978.
69. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
70. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: Abbas No Longer Heads PA," Jerusalem Post, January 9, 2009.
71. Tova Lazeroff and Yaakov Katz, "Israel Disputes Gaza Death Toll," Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2009.
72. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Al Aksa: We Also Fought IDF in Gaza," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
73. Akiva Eldar, "Report: EU to Lift Sanctions on Hamas if Palestinian Unity Government Formed," Ha'aretz, January 19, 2009.
74. http://tonyblairoffice.org/2009/01/gaza-ceasefire-must-be-followe.html.
75. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to ‘Steal' Gaza Funds."
76. Robert Satloff, "In the Wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America's ‘Grand Strategy' for the New Palestinian Authority," Policy Watch, No. 1252, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 26, 2007.
77. The notion of "bottom-up" peace-making based on broad Palestinian reform was coined by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon, and alluded to as a point of reference by Special Quartet Envoy Tony Blair. See http://tonyblairoffice.org/2008/05/towards-a-palestinian-state.html. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also referred to "bottom-up" peace-making in concert with his program of "economic peace" for the West Bank.
__________________________________________________
Dan Diker is Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, where he is also a senior foreign policy analyst. He is also an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington. Khaled Abu Toameh is Palestinian affairs correspondent and analyst for the Jerusalem Post and a number of foreign TV stations and newspapers. They are currently co-authoring a book on the Middle East peace process.
By Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs | Friday, January 30, 2009
Israel's three-week military operation in Gaza in December-January has raised the issue of the possible return of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party to Gaza to replace the Hamas regime. The Israelis, Americans, the major European powers, and especially the Egyptians favor Abbas' forces regaining control not only over Gaza's border crossings, but also over the entire Strip. However, international demands for Fatah's return to Gaza face seemingly intractable obstacles.
A previous U.S.-funded and armed Fatah security regime in Gaza had entirely failed. Years of massive corruption and gangsterism by Fatah security forces resulted in an Iranian-financed, armed and trained Islamic emirate ruled by Hamas. Abbas had had the full backing of the international community to turn Gaza into the Hong Kong of the Middle East. Instead, Fatah collapsed under a Hamas assault in summer 2007.
Currently, the U.S.-sponsored Fatah forces in the West Bank are still ill-prepared for the task of taking control in Gaza. Two modest paramilitary forces have been trained to police crime and enforce public order, but not to uproot terror groups. In fact, the PA has increasingly offered safe haven to terror groups. Brig.-Gen. Radhi Assida, the PA National Security Forces (NSF) commander in Jenin, revealed to the Palestinian website Maan on January 24, 2009, that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's NSF had agreed to provide protection to four senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists wanted by Israel. Assida also confirmed that PIJ operatives continue to receive monthly salaries from the PA Interior Ministry, just like their colleagues in the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.1 Furthermore, thousands of Fatah security operatives in Gaza and the West Bank have realigned their loyalties away from Abbas and Fayyad. Other armed militias are currently less active or dormant but remain armed and intact. Some local militia commanders continue mafia-like criminal enterprises while simultaneously working as local commanders in PA security forces, thereby continuing to undermine public trust.
In post-war Gaza, Fatah forces would face a wall of opposition from Hamas and many other Jihadi groups. Hamas' military leadership remains intact, as do most of its terror capabilities. Hamas continues to enjoy popular support from a majority of Palestinians, particularly those living in Gaza, despite public anger over the war. Fatah will be hard-pressed to re-take the Gaza Strip because the party has lost credibility among Palestinians, largely because of its failure to reform itself and get rid of icons of corruption among the top brass.2
International Calls for Fatah's Return to Gaza
Israel's military campaign to destroy the Hamas army and terror infrastructure in Gaza triggered broad international efforts to implement a cease-fire that would include the return of Palestinian Authority forces to Gaza. The international community appears determined to help stop weapons smuggling into Gaza and reopen the Gaza border crossings to Egypt and Israel and restore a Gaza-West Bank link.3
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is backing the return of Abbas' forces to the crossings in line with the U.S.-brokered 2005 border crossing agreements.4 He hosted the major European powers at Sharm al-Sheik on January 18, 2009, immediately following the Gaza cease-fire, to discuss new security measures to stop Hamas weapons smuggling beneath the Egyptian-Gaza border and to secure the flow of humanitarian aid via the crossings.
The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1860 that explicitly called for restoring the 2005 Gaza crossing agreement between the PA and Israel and affirming Gaza as an integral part of PA-controlled territory.5 Abbas traveled to the UN in New York to support the resolution.6 PA officials in the West Bank also indicated a readiness to send forces to Gaza, but noted, "It depends on whether Israel manages to get rid of the Hamas regime."7 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the UN Security Council that stabilizing Gaza will "require a principled resolution of the political challenges in Gaza that reestablishes ultimately the Palestinian Authority's legitimate control and facilitates the normal operation of all crossings."8 President Barak Obama has called for the reopening of the Gaza border crossings, while making his first overseas phone call to a foreign leader to PA Chairman Abbas to express support.9
Which "Fatah Forces" are Jerusalem, Washington, and Cairo Counting On?
The convergence of opposition to Hamas in Washington, Cairo, Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Ramallah could serve as a pretext for regime change in Gaza. However, international hopes for such a change may be premature since the PA's security forces do not constitute a single, professional, experienced and disciplined military organization under a centralized chain of command. Rather, Fatah security forces are divided into several paramilitary groups in the West Bank and Gaza, some more reformed and effective than others.
Since Oslo, Fatah's multiple security forces constitute several militias that were originally established and commanded by Yasser Arafat, who employed Palestinian "graduates" of Israeli prisons and others who lacked any formal police or security training.10 Today, however, some of the PA forces are far more professional, having been equipped and trained by U.S. security officials in Jordan.11 PA National Security Forces report to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, while Mahmoud Abbas controls the Presidential Guard, a smaller force that protects the Abbas regime and functions as a police force. However, these forces are still in their infancy. They have less than one year's experience, number fewer than 1,500 men, and lack a chief of staff and an overall "top-down" central command structure. Fayyad's NSF has not yet demonstrated the ability or will to uproot both active and dormant terror groups and militias.12
In Gaza, Fatah retains a residual, yet completely decentralized, force infrastructure of competing security militias that are not loyal to Abbas but to local leaders, militia commanders, and crime families.13
One of the problems in creating a robust PA military force large enough to reassert control in Gaza is that Palestinian commanders do not automatically enjoy the loyalty of their soldiers. Palestinian allegiances are invariably influenced by Arab cultural affiliations to clan, family, town, neighborhood, and political group. Many Palestinian NSF officers have family members and close relatives that are employed by competing security organizations or armed militias, which makes all-out armed confrontation highly unlikely. That explains in part the Fatah collapse in June 2007, as its forces were unable to confront their brothers, cousins, and uncles in Hamas.
Fatah Forces in Gaza
In Gaza, tens of thousands of former Fatah security personnel and activists maintain loyalties to various former PA security forces and commanders, such as the deposed former strongman Mohammed Dahlan. Some former Fatah security personnel have found employment with the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Hamas and local crime families such as the Dughmush and al-Samhadana clans, and local al-Qaeda-inspired Salafist groups such as Jaish al-Islam, Fatah al-Islam, and Jaish al-Umma. The Fatah umbrella in Gaza also includes a number of smaller militias such as the Abu Rish Brigades, which had broken away from Fatah's Preventive Security forces.
Some of the fourteen competing security organizations Arafat had established after the signing of the Oslo agreements were disbanded in 2005 under the direction of the U.S. Special Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, who moved to enforce Quartet Roadmap reforms. However, the unofficial militias have never been uprooted or disbanded. Instead, militia members froze their activities by agreement with the PA in exchange for compensation from the PA and clemency from Israel. Some local militia group commanders were even integrated into the "reformed" security forces under U.S. supervision, as ranking officers, while they continued to extort and threaten local businessmen.14
In 2009, thousands of "unemployed" Fatah militiamen, such as members of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, still hold weapons that they conceal in their homes. In their current dormant status, they also continue to receive monthly salaries from the Palestinian Authority on the instructions of Abbas and Fayyad,15 who are eager to avoid conflict with these groups and to protect themselves from the death threats made by the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas against them.16
Hamas Threatens, Fatah Pays
The enmity between Fatah and Hamas is far greater than Palestinian hatred of Israel.17 Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, described Hamas as "insects" in the final week of Israel's offensive in Gaza.18 Hamas legislator Salah Bardaweel countered that PA Chairman Abbas "played a major role" in the Israeli killing of Hamas Interior Minister Said Siam "through his men in the Gaza Strip, who have been pointing out the homes of Hamas members."19 However, what is remarkable and ignored in Western diplomatic circles is that Fayyad has continued to pay the monthly salaries of between 6,000 and 12,000 Hamas Executive Force operatives in Gaza, in line with the 2007 Mecca national unity agreement that brought Hamas under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority for budgetary purposes.20
It is widely believed in Western diplomatic circles that the PA in Ramallah was only paying the salaries of civil service employees in Gaza to encourage them to stay at home to avoid working with Hamas, especially after Hamas' expulsion of Fatah in June 2007. This is incorrect. The PA, and indirectly the U.S., and international donor countries have continued to pay monthly salaries to Hamas security operatives (Read: terrorists) and their commanders from the PA's $120 million monthly budget allocation to the Gaza Strip.21 The height of irony in this regard may have been seen during the Gaza war when Hamas fighters received their salaries from the PA at Gaza City's Shifa Hospital which was immune from IDF fire.22
Understanding the Hidden Complexities of the Fatah Security Forces
The prospective return of any Fatah security forces to Gaza must take into account the complexities of the many competing centers of Fatah power, as well their implications within the context of Palestinian political culture. For the past 16 years, U.S., European, and Israeli policy-makers have lavished billions of dollars on "strong" leaders like Arafat, or actively sought to strengthen "weak" leaders like Abbas, without assessing the effect of these policies on the internal Palestinian political discussion.23 For example, the PA received $3 billion in 2008, according to French estimates,24 while the December 2007 Paris donor's conference committed to transfer over $7 billion in aid to the PA over the years 2008-2010.25 Yet the Palestinian public still sees U.S.-led international assistance as a virtual "payoff" to a corrupt government and security forces in exchange for PA cooperation.
After years of unsuccessful Western-backed PA security regimes, since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, and through the Annapolis agreement in 2008, the Palestinian street is largely convinced that U.S. backing of the PA has sanctified brutality, state-approved "gangsterism," and corruption in the name of stopping radicals and advancing the peace process. Palestinian public cynicism translated into Hamas' landslide parliamentary victory in 2006 and its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007. This analysis, then, may serve as a basis for careful reconsideration of past misassumptions about Fatah's security capabilities and help clarify current security realities in Gaza.
Back to Square One? The Return of Mohammed Dahlan
Former PA Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan, who had headed the U.S.-backed Fatah Preventive Security force in Gaza until Hamas routed his forces in June 2007, has re-emerged as a leading candidate to command Fatah's security forces, particularly to secure the Gaza crossing points into Egypt and Israel. Despite Hamas' bloody thrashing of Dahlan's forces, his prospective return to Gaza reportedly aroused the interest of former Secretary of State Rice.26 Palestinian and Egyptian leaders have also been interested in Dahlan's reassertion of control.27 While Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak reportedly told PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad that, "For me, Dahlan does not exist,"28 current circumstances would point to his involvement in any new PA security force in Gaza.
Dahlan appears to have emerged from retirement to his Cairo villa where he had kept a low profile since the Hamas takeover. However, he has of late given many interviews on Egyptian and Saudi media outlets, blasting Hamas' deep connection to Iran while making thinly veiled suggestions as to his potential role in rebuilding Gaza.29 It is no coincidence that the Egyptians and Saudis are providing Dahlan a platform to condemn Hamas. Cairo and Riyadh quietly backed the Israeli operation in Gaza and had backed Dahlan's forces with some $20 million before the 2007 coup.30
Although Dahlan lost many men and even his home to Hamas, he continues to enjoy the backing of several thousand armed Fatah activists who have remained in Gaza under Hamas rule. A major motivating factor behind Dahlan's possible return is the billions of dollars in international aid that have been promised to finance reconstruction efforts. Dahlan had built his personal fortune by being Fatah's key man in Gaza between 1996 and 2007.31 Perhaps most significantly, Dahlan may be the only Palestinian leader unfazed by threats of revenge by other Palestinian groups.32
Reports of U.S. interest in Dahlan's re-involvement in Gaza follow nearly twelve years of close coordination with the United States. He had been a long-time favorite of the Clinton and Bush administrations and was praised as a reformer during the Oslo years for publicly criticizing Arafat's dictatorship and calling for Palestinian security reforms.33 Starting in 1996, President Clinton approved intensive CIA and FBI backing of Dahlan's Preventive Security forces and other PA security organs.34
Dahlan's relationships with Washington were top-tier.35 He referred to Bill Clinton as "a friend." Dahlan was also embraced by lawmakers and senior security officials alike.36 A senior member of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence told the authors in 2005 that Dahlan was "charming." Dahlan too understood the importance of his U.S. partners. In early 2008 Dahlan said of CIA Director George Tenet, "He is simply a great and fair man."37 President George W. Bush also met with Dahlan on several occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as "a good, solid leader" and reportedly called him "our guy" to advisors behind closed doors.38
Reviving a Failed Security Paradigm?
A key question is whether Dahlan's possible return essentially revives a failed strategy. Until Dahlan's forces collapsed before Hamas, the U.S. had placed its full weight behind him, investing at least $56 million in the PA security infrastructure at the Karni crossing39 where General Dayton had invested much of his time before the Hamas coup.40 The U.S. had also backed a high-risk, covert State Department plan code-named "Plan B,"41 that was drafted jointly by U.S., Jordanian, and PA officials, that called for Dahlan's Fatah forces to overthrow Hamas in Gaza and reassert control.42 While the White House vigorously denied any such designs, the plan was widely known among senior Fatah officials.43
Dayton, though listed as a key figure in the Dahlan project, would later deny any material involvement with the plan.44 However, he testified before Congress on May 23, 2007, just weeks before the Fatah collapse in Gaza, saying, "the $3 million assistance package to the (Palestinian) Office of National Security ensures that the U.S. Security Coordinator has a strong and capable partner as we proceed with Palestinian security sector transformation and our focus on a smaller but more capable Palestinian security force, operating under the rule of law and with respect for human rights."45 Yet Dayton's security program was roundly criticized by senior Israeli defense officials as "a complete failure."46
It is widely recognized in Palestinian circles that at the time of the Hamas coup, Dahlan's Fatah force simply refused to fight. Fewer than 10,000 armed Hamas men managed to defeat 70,000 U.S.-backed Fatah loyalists. It is also no secret among Palestinians that Dahlan was shuttling between Cairo and Germany for "medical treatment" for bad knees during the fighting, despite having been paid handsomely for his security efforts.47 Hamas did not have to work hard to repel a Fatah takeover attempt. Hamas operatives recruited Fatah family members to convince their relatives in uniform to surrender without fighting.
The Gaza debacle was a setback for Dahlan. The extent of his personal fortune - amassed during the time when he cooperated closely with Washington on the peace process - may not be well known by the incoming U.S. administration. Palestinian documents captured in the IDF's 2002 Defensive Shield operation revealed Dahlan's involvement in major racketeering, including revenues from cigarettes, cement, and the collection of illegal crossing fees.48 He was also known as a partner in the smuggling networks involving the Rafah border tunnels, together with the al-Samhadana crime family.
Ironically, even prior to 2007, U.S. security officials had not been deterred by Dahlan's actions and reputation on the Palestinian street. He had been a key architect of the 2005 border crossing agreements that he designed with U.S. Secretary of State Rice, but which fell apart after Hamas violence drove European monitors to abandon their posts. Glenn Kessler noted in his 2007 biography of Rice that in the 2005 Gaza crossing agreements, "Rice focused especially on Mohammed Dahlan, the Palestinian Authority's civil affairs minister, but in effect Fatah's boss in Gaza, because Abbas would never agree to a deal unless Dahlan gave his approval."49 Dahlan had controlled the security and economic aspects of the Karni and Rafah crossing points, where at least 750 truckloads of goods and 1,000 Palestinians passed daily including many Hamas leaders that were on Israel's "wanted" list.50 Costly import licenses and crossing permits were all in the hands of Dahlan's people and are widely believed to have generated millions of dollars in profits.
A former senior World Bank official had estimated Dahlan's personal wealth at well over $120 million as of mid-2005, just before Israel's disengagement from Gaza.51 Dahlan's personal fortune is a notable achievement, since most of his life has been spent in and around Gaza refugee camps, Israeli prisons, and Fatah security installations.
Palestinian Impatience with Dahlan
Gazans and West Bankers have been less forgiving than the U.S. of Dahlan's record. The former Gaza strongman's reputation for brutality, extortion, and corruption precedes him. Torture of Hamas and other opponents in Gaza by Dahlan loyalists have even been documented on "YouTube."52 Fatah websites implicated him, together with the Gaza-based Dughmush clan, in the 2005 murder of General Musa Arafat, Fatah's former head of Military Intelligence and National Security forces in Gaza.53 The Palestinian street had branded Dahlan "the CIA" for years, ever since the U.S. agency had provided him a black bullet-proof SUV.
No less troubling for Israel is the fact that years of CIA and Israeli Security Agency coordination did not prevent Dahlan's alleged complicity in ordering a deadly terror attack against an Israeli school bus in Gaza on November 18, 2000, that killed two adults and severely wounded three children from the Cohen family who were former Gush Katif residents.54
Mahmoud Abbas' PA Presidential Guard
While the United States, Egypt, and Western countries have mentioned the possible return to Gaza of PA forces loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, his direct authority and influence has been limited to the Ramallah-based Presidential Guard - a modest 1,500-man armed force. The Presidential Guard is tasked with protecting the PA Chairman and the Fatah regime but not foiling terror attacks, or uprooting militias in the West Bank. Even with dedicated security forces that continue to undergo U.S.-sponsored training at bases near Jericho in line with the Roadmap security reform program, Abbas rarely ventures out of Ramallah.
The dangers to Abbas posed by various terror groups, militias, warlords, and gangs have prevented him from visiting most Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank, let alone refugee camps, earning him the reputation on the Palestinian street of being "the Mayor of Ramallah." The Presidential Guard's record in Gaza is mixed. They were among the first to surrender to Hamas in June 2007, and subsequently were not officially disbanded but became dormant, as opposed to their West Bank counterparts that were retrained and resupplied by U.S. military advisors under General Dayton.55
Salam Fayyad's Palestinian National Security Forces
The Palestinian National Security Forces that are funded by and report to the office of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are the most likely security command that could be deployed to Gaza in the framework of a cease-fire agreement. The NSF was restructured following the 2007 defeat by Hamas. Secretary of State Rice worked closely with General Dayton and Fayyad to retrofit a verifiably reformed Palestinian force in line with the Annapolis peace process framework of a shelf agreement between Israel and the PA that would come to fruition if and when the PA would be capable of fulfilling its security requirements under the first stage of the Quartet Roadmap. The U.S. provided $86 million in July 2007 to train 1,100 recruits, while another $75 million was earmarked for a national security installation under construction near Jericho.56
The NSF's motivation to succeed stems from the Fatah leadership's fear of a Hamas takeover in the West Bank. The NSF's initial successes in several West Bank cities, including Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem, have restored a certain sense of public security to local residents, as well as attracting thousands of Israeli Arabs to shop in Jenin and Nablus which has helped jumpstart the West Bank economy.
Since its first deployment in May 2008, the NSF - which Hamas has branded "the Dayton forces" - has forcefully confronted Hamas supporters in the West Bank. The NSF has also closed down some Hamas charities in public displays of force, while redirecting Hamas charity money to PA coffers. PA security forces have also arrested Hamas activists and have reduced threatening activity in Hamas-controlled mosques. The readiness of the NSF to confront Hamas publicly is unprecedented; Arafat had avoided confronting Hamas, while Fayyad is doing so.
Despite intensive U.S. and Palestinian efforts to maximize performance, there still remains a large question mark over whether these forces possess the ability and will to take more aggressive action against terror groups and armed gangs in the West Bank, and whether they stand a chance of successfully redeploying to Gaza. General Dayton admitted in a December 2008 interview that the NSF "is not the Israel Defense Forces. They are orienting their efforts totally on the lawless elements within Palestinian society...so that Palestinian families can walk down the streets at night and not be intimidated or threatened by either criminals or men with guns."57
Some Israel Defense Forces senior commanders agree with Dayton. In fact, IDF Central Command has been highly critical of the U.S.-backed PA forces, insisting that PA forces in the West Bank cities are not combating terrorists, while warning that "terrorist organizations in Nablus, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were cooperating in their attempts to perpetrate terror attacks against Israel, and building an underground tunnel system in Nablus."58 According to a senior IDF official, "There is no doubt that the moment the IDF leaves this territory, the Palestinians will have a rocket capability in the West Bank."59
Fatah's Rejection of Fayyad: A Roadblock to Gaza
The PA's NSF is funded by and reports to the office of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. His office and the PA Interior Ministry vet candidates and pay salaries, while Mahmoud Abbas is not directly involved with the NSF. This is significant because U.S. and European efforts to implement a Gaza cease-fire have included discussion of the return of PA security forces to Gaza that are "loyal to Abbas." Yet the U.S.-backed post-Gaza security reform concept was to create a non-Fatah professional army. However, other than an initial round of recruited commanders who were not from Fatah, subsequent officer recruits were mostly affiliated with Fatah. This reflects Fayyad's own problematic political status in the PA areas. He is not a Fatah member and receives no political backing from the Fatah power structure.
Moreover, Fayyad's lack of grassroots support handicaps his ability to maintain control and loyalty of commanders and forces in the field, which would only be exacerbated should Fatah seek a return to Gaza. This is significant because Fayyad's close cooperation with the United States, the West, and Israel must also translate to implementation on the ground. While Fayyad is probably the most impressive professional Palestinian statesman the U.S. and the West have ever worked with, Palestinian elites and the public essentially view Fayyad as a de facto American agent. While Abbas has also cooperated closely with Israel, the U.S., and the West, and has also received death threats on Hamas and Fatah terror group websites, his status as Fatah royalty protects him from opponents and maintains his political base.
Senior Fatah advisors and former ministers close to Abbas have been critical of the U.S. decision to place the PA's major security force in the hands of Fayyad. The Fatah central committee even voted in Ramallah in November 2008 to compel Abbas to remove Fayyad from being in charge of the NSF and to replace with him with a Fatah member. In late January 2009, Fayyad offered to resign his post following accusations by Fatah that Fayyad was an obstacle to reconciliation with Hamas.60
Dormant Terror Groups: The Hidden Threat to the West Bank and Gaza
Hamas is not the only major threat to Fayyad's forces in the West Bank. There are multiple armed terror groups and militias that have temporarily kept a low profile. However, they are capable of undermining the entire PA security regime. Despite reports in early 2008 by Fayyad's office that militias such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank had been dismantled, it turned out that Fayyad had essentially agreed to a mutually advantageous modus vivendi with these groups. Gunmen have agreed to hide their weapons, and Fayyad has agreed to "hide" operatives on Israel's target list in PA jails under a "revolving door" policy allowing freedom of entry and exit, which had created serious concern among senior IDF commanders.61 Fayyad also reached agreement with Israel on a general clemency program for some militia members in exchange for their commitment to cease all terror activity against Israel.62 However, senior IDF commanders have also expressed related concerns that since the NSF deployment, "weapons provided by the U.S. to the PA are finding their way to Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin as well as in Nablus."63 Abbas also had expended great efforts to incorporate the Islamic terrorist organizations into the Palestinian government.64
Another major concern of the IDF senior command has been that local terror militias, such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, have also been integrated into local NSF units. Such militia leaders include Abu Jaber, an infamous local gang leader in Nablus who is also a NSF commander, who regularly extorts Nablus business owners for protection money.65
Gaza: From "Hamastan" to "Fatahland"
While the West sees the PA's Abbas and Fayyad as the only legitimate Palestinian address, the issue is far more complex within the Palestinian political discussion. Abbas is seen by the Palestinian street as "done," incapable of delivering peace or anything of value to the Palestinians.66 Despite Palestinian anger at Hamas for causing the recent IDF incursion, many Palestinians, including elites and even traditional Fatah allies, still see Hamas as democratically legitimate since it won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Hamas appears to be more popular than ever among the Palestinians residents of Gaza. In mid-December 2008, some 250,000 Palestinians took to the streets to celebrate Hamas' 21st anniversary.67
Abbas is likely to face substantial roadblocks to reestablishing Fatah control or coming to a modus vivendi with Hamas. Fatah-Hamas tensions are at a high point. Hamas and much of the Gazan public are convinced that Abbas supplied Israel with intelligence and other operational information to use to destroy the Hamas terror infrastructure. As Palestinian analyst Mohammed Yaghi noted, "Hamas even accused Nimir Hamad, Abbas' political adviser, of calling Israeli defense official Amos Gilad and advising him to target Hamas operators and installations only."68 In fact, since the outset of Israel's military operation in Gaza, Fatah members there have been rounded up and brutally tortured by Hamas operatives, who have turned school buildings and hospitals into make-shift interrogation centers.69 Hamas also renewed house arrest orders against Fatah officials and activists in Gaza shortly after the military operation started. Since the cease-fire, Hamas has stolen international relief shipments, even hijacking international aid trucks to prevent Fatah from taking any credit in the eyes of the Palestinians.
Hamas no longer recognizes the presidential authority of Mahmoud Abbas after his four-year term ended on January 9, 2009, although Abbas has decided to remain in office, based on his reading of Palestinian law.70 More importantly, the Hamas leadership is still intact. The IDF estimates that 400 to 700 Hamas operatives were killed in the Gaza operation.71 That leaves most of Hamas' 15,000-man army and 10,000-man police force in place, including Izaddine al-Kassam, the Hamas Executive Force, and internal security forces. A significant quantity of Hamas weapons and ammunition remains hidden. Furthermore, during and after the IDF operation, Hamas continued to smuggle weapons and contraband via underground tunnels from Sinai to Gaza.
Hamas is not concerned about a tactical reconciliation with Fatah. Several scenarios can serve Hamas interests. Hamas may agree to a Fatah-Hamas national "reconciliation" government for tactical reasons, as it did in 2007, to gain international recognition, benefit from the billions of dollars of international aid, and rebuild their offensive capabilities against Israel using the Fatah-led PA as a fig leaf. At the same time, Hamas will again subvert Fatah control on the ground.
Alternatively, Hamas may return to its more natural role as the agent of muqawama (Islamic armed resistance) while reengaging Fatah forces in another round of civil war, which has killed hundreds of Palestinians since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. The armed strife intensified after the Palestinian national unity government was brokered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in February 2007 and lasted until the Hamas takeover in June of that year.
Hamas is not the only opposition force that Abbas will face. Fatah's armed wing, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, announced on January 19, 2009, that its men in Gaza fought against Israel alongside Hamas, together with Islamic Jihad's Al-Quds Battalions. The Al Aksa Brigades said they fired 102 rockets and 35 mortars, and detonated explosive devices that wounded a number of IDF soldiers.72
The U.S. and European Role in Securing and Rebuilding Gaza
Frenetic Western diplomatic efforts have been focused on rebuilding Gaza under the control of the PA's West Bank leadership as a prelude to a final settlement. Washington and European powers have already committed several billion dollars to Gaza's reconstruction. They are anxious for a final settlement, and European leaders led by French President Nicholas Sarkozy are reportedly even willing to recognize Hamas in the context of a Fatah-Hamas unity government.73 Special UN envoy Tony Blair has also expressed his support for the idea.74 However, the current realities in Gaza may frustrate Western diplomatic plans.
It is far from clear that under current conditions any constellation of Fatah forces could successfully restore stability in Gaza, hope for Gazans, and long-term security for Israel. Despite the important yet limited security and economic reforms PA Prime Minister Fayyad has undertaken in the West Bank, the Palestinian public, both in Gaza and the West Bank, are far from confident that Fatah is anything but an incorrigibly corrupt and brutal regime that continues to be rewarded with billions of dollars from the U.S., Europe, and Israel. Since the cease-fire, some senior Fatah leaders have allegedly moved quickly to set up "straw" construction and contracting firms in the hope that the estimated $2.5 billion earmarked for rebuilding Gaza will be funneled through the PA and its privileged elites in Ramallah.75 Indeed, the Fatah-led P.A. will need to do much confidence-building to earn the trust of the Palestinian public.
The United States and the West must avoid the temptation of once again blindly relying on Fatah as the sole security and reconstruction subcontractor for Gaza. The Obama administration must implement tough and verifiable directives to facilitate internal Palestinian housecleaning: no militias, good governance, complete accountability, full transparency, effectiveness, and zero tolerance for corruption, gangsterism, and terror within PA ranks in Gaza and the West Bank. These steps are critical for the future of the Palestinian project and take immediate precedence over current negotiations with Israel.76
At the same time, U.S.-backed security efforts in the West Bank will need to be upgraded to ensure the complete cessation of all direct and indirect militia involvement on the ground or as part of the current NSF security regime. Only a decision to uproot the active and dormant militias and armed groups will ensure stability and enable the socioeconomic, "bottom-up" infrastructure-building that special envoy Tony Blair has worked diligently to develop in advance of renewed diplomacy.77
Any new Fatah-related security regime and government in Gaza that receives U.S. and Western financial support must also be required to submit to unprecedented oversight of rebuilding efforts, in order to implement missing financial controls and adopt "best-practice" standards. Corrupt and brutal warlords, gangs, and militias must no longer be allowed to undermine the Palestinian national project while they remain protected, privileged and empowered by the U.S.-backed Palestinian Authority.
_______________________________________________
Notes
1. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
2. Fatah officials in the West Bank are also demoralized. Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, told a British reporter that the "Hamas are insects" and noted that the Palestinians would likely not see a Palestinian state in his lifetime. Qadura Fares, a senior Fatah official, said that the PA would not succeed either in the West Bank or Gaza without "tackling the privileges of the Fatah elite, who, he said, "have become like princes" with regard to personal wealth, referring to rampant Fatah corruption. David Rose, "In the Smart West Bank Health Club, Between Jogging and Swimming Laps, People Were Screaming ‘Death to Israel'," Mail on Sunday, January 17, 2009.
3. French President Nicholas Sarkozy said: "We have pledged to help Israel and Egypt with all the technical, military, naval and diplomatic ways to help end the smuggling of weapons into Gaza," http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1056208.html. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown also offered to send British naval vessels to battle smuggling, http://www.wtop.com/?nid=105&sid=1577726.
4. Mona Salem, "Egypt Rejects Calls to Open Border with War-Battered Gaza," AFP, December 30, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081230/wl_mideast_afp/ mideastconflictgazaegyptborder_081230191014.
5. For the full text of UNSC Resolution 1860, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9567.doc.htm.
6. Barak Ravid, "Egypt's Truce Plan: Cease-fire Followed by Border Security Talks," Ha'aretz, January 7, 2009.
7. Khaled Abu Toameh, "PA Ready to Take Gaza if Hamas Ousted," Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2008.
8. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009/01/113629.htm. President Bush also called for international monitors in a radio speech on January 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090102-3.html.
9. Natasha Mozgovaya, "Obama.: We will Aggressively Seek Middle East Peace," Ha'aretz, January 23, 2009. See also Roni Sofer, "Obama Calls Abbas, Olmert on First Day," Ynet, January 21, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3659961,00.html.
10. Khaled Abu Toameh and Dan Diker, "What Happened to Reform of the Palestinian Authority?," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 3, 2004, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp? DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=701.
11. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different," Interview with U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1228728164523& pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
12. Senior officials close to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas confirmed the lack of a Palestinian chief of staff and a disciplined, centralized command structure in several meetings with author Dan Diker in 2008, most recently in Tel Aviv, December 8, 2008. Also, the authors draw a distinction between the Palestinian National Security Forces' success in confronting Hamas activists in Ramallah and closing down Hamas charities, and the PA security forces' lack of will to uproot Hamas and other terror groups. This has been common to PA control in Gaza and the West Bank and had characterized PA security force failures in the 1990s. Other less active, yet competing, Fatah militias include PA Preventative Security under the command of Ziad Hab al-Rih, a Fatah operative and former colleague of former West Bank Fatah strongman Jibril Rajoub. There are also other smaller Fatah-affiliated armed groups.
13. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat and the Battle for the Spoils of Gaza," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 10, 2005, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=542
14. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies," Front Page Magazine, October 18, 2005. In a more recent example, local Nablus warlord Abu Jabber was integrated in Fayyad's National Security Forces in 2008 as a mid-level commander, but this did not stop his local militia from continuing to extort local business owners for protection money. One local real estate developer related to the authors that Abu Jabber had demanded an apartment for free in exchange for his militias' forced protection services. This same phenomenon - national security by day and mafia member by night - has characterized the PA Fatah forces in the West Bank from Arafat's entry into the territories in 1994 until today under the Dayton reform plan outlined at Annapolis. American security programs under the Clinton administration had ended up training numerous PA terror operatives such as Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades terrorist Khaled Abu Nijmeh, who had used his CIA training to supervise multiple suicide bombings in Bethlehem in 2001 and 2002. A July 2005 report compiled by the security consulting firm Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI) on behalf of the U.S. government found that, "even with millions of American dollars and years of CIA training, the PA police were wholly ineffective, wracked with divided loyalties and inferior equipment." SAI charged that "many of the PA officers were active or complicit in terrorist attacks or organized crime rings." See Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
15. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
16. For example, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades websites have called for the murder of Fayyad since 2003, while Hamas' Izaddine al-Kassam Brigades website called Abbas "a murderer" for his actions against Hamas operatives and "justified exercising the use of divine justice against him, relying on religious decrees that permit the killing of a Muslim who collaborates in a crime against another Muslim." See Lt.-Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "The Hamas Regime in the Gaza Strip: An Iranian Satellite that Threatens Regional Stability," in Iran's Race for Regional Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, p.76.
17. Reports from Gaza indicate that hundreds of Fatah members were killed and tortured by Hamas during and after Israel's military campaign in Gaza. See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," January 19, 2009. Fatah and Hamas websites reveal the bitter hatred and enmity between the groups that will not be solved if the groups agree for tactical reasons to enter into a national unity government. This is frequently misunderstood in the West, which believes that a Fatah-Hamas "reconciliation" - like the one brokered in Mecca in 2007 and which resulted in more deaths between Fatah and Hamas than in previous years - would be a pretext for advancing the peace process. A senior advisor to French President Nicholas Sarkozy told Ha'aretz that a Fatah-Hamas national unity government would trigger EU acceptance of Hamas as a governmental partner to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
18. Dan Diker, "A Deterrent Restored," Powerlineblog, January 9, 2009, http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2009/01/022505.php.
19. Khaled Abu Toameh Hamas: Abbas' Spies Led Israel to Siam," Jerusalem Post, January 17, 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ ShowFull&cid=1232100169312.
20. http://www.janes.com/security/law_enforcement/news/jdw/jdw070115_1_n.shtml. A high-ranking official at a senior Palestinian ministry confirmed PA monthly salary payments to Hamas' Executive Force in Gaza and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades in the West Bank, in a meeting with the authors in Jerusalem, December 7, 2008.
21. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to ‘Steal' Gaza Funds," Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2009.
22. Amir Mizroch, "Hamas Salaries Paid at Shifa Hospital," Jerusalem Post, January 12, 2009.
23. See the strategic assessment by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon on the error of Israeli and Western backing of "strong" and "weak" Palestinian leaders in "Israel and the Palestinians; a New Strategy," op. cit.
24. "French Envoy, Palestinians Given $3B in Foreign Aid in 2008," AP/Ha'aretz, December 23, 2008.
25. Elaine Sciolino, "$7.4 Billion Pledged for Palestinians," New York Times, December 18, 2007, as cited in Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians."
26. According to a conversation with a senior Israeli security official, January 13, 2009.
27. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Shuns Bid to Give Rafah to PA," Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2009. Dahlan's candidacy to reassert Fatah control in Gaza was confirmed by senior PA officials in a meeting with author Dan Diker on December 8, 2009. Two Arab diplomats familiar with negotiations over an Israeli-Hamas cease-fire also confirmed his candidacy in separate conversations with Diker on January 6 and January 11, 2009. Hamas leaders have also pointed to Dahlan's possible return. A Hamas official in Gaza City claimed that former Fatah security commanders who fled Gaza during the Hamas takeover in June 2007, including Mohammed Dahlan and his deputy Rashid Abu Shabak, "were holding meetings in Cairo and Ramallah to discuss returning home." See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: PA Conspiring with Israel," Jerusalem Post, December 31, 2008.
28.According to a senior source in the Bureau of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, January 12, 2009.
29. Mohammed Dahlan interview, Egyptian State Television, January 21, 2009.
30. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, April 2008.
31. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat," op. cit. Dahlan was believed to be a local partner in the UK Portland Trust plan to develop hundreds of low-cost housing units in post-disengagement Gaza.
32. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Analysis: A Viable Successor to Hamas Is Hard to Find," Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2009. Ramadan Shallah, secretary-general of Islamic Jihad, warned that any Palestinian "who dares to return to the Gaza Strip aboard an Israeli tank would be condemned as a traitor." Senior Arab diplomats told author Dan Diker on January 9, 2009, that Dahlan is not concerned with Palestinian threats against him.
33. Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
34. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
35. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
36. A senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee told author Dan Diker that Dahlan was "very charming" at a meeting on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., June 2005.
37. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. A former State Department employee familiar with the concept and planning of what was called "Plan B" to replace Hamas with Dahlan's forces confirmed the plan to the author in an off-the-record interview, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2008. See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different," op. cit.
40. Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
41. See a copy of the note reportedly left in a meeting in Ramallah between PA and U.S. officials, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_PlanB0804.pdf. See a copy of the pre-"Plan B" U.S. security plan from 2006 left behind at a meeting between U.S. and Palestinian officials in Ramallah, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_Walles0804.pdf.
42. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell." See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
43. Former PA Interior Minister and senior Abbas advisor Hanni al-Hassan shared his sharp criticism of the plan with the author in a meeting several days after the coup on June 17, 2007.
44. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State," Ha'aretz, August 14, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009578.html.
45. "Remarks by U.S. Security Coordinator, LTG Keith Dayton, Update on the Israeli-Palestinian Situation and Palestinian Assistance Programs," House Foreign Affairs, Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, May 23, 2007, www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/day052307.htm.
46. Yaakov Katz, "Israeli Official: Dayton Failed," Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2007.
47. According to Hanni al-Hassan, former senior advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, in a meeting with the author, June 17, 2007. Hani al-Hassan, former senior political advisor and member of Fatah's central committee, said in an Al-Jazeera TV interview on June 27, 2007, that what was happening in Gaza was not a Hamas defeat of Fatah but defeat of plans of American Major General Keith Dayton, Mohammed Dahlan and his Fatah followers. See http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3418486,00.html. See the Al-Jazeera interview at http://uk.truveo.com/Hani-AlHassan-of-the-Fatah-Executive-Committee/id/517194181. David Wurmser, former Middle East Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, would later note, "It looks to me that what happened wasn't so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen." See David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
48. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
49. Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, Condoleezza Rice and the Bush Legacy (New York: St. Martins Press, 2007), p. 133.
50. Erica Silverman, "Two Steps Back," Al-Ahram Weekly, December 8-14, 2005.
51. Dan Diker meeting with former senior World Bank official, Jerusalem, July 2005.
52. David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
53. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
54. According to Haggai Huberman writing in Hatzofe, the former Sharon government had been provided a secret CIA tape recording of Dahlan ordering the attack.
55. For many months in 2008 Abbas and Fayyad did not speak, coordinate positions, or cooperate. More recent reports indicate that their working relationship has slightly improved. They are essentially leaders of two separate Palestinian Authorities. Fayyad is the U.S. contact, while Abbas is the leader of the Fatah establishment and has been a source of disappointment to the Bush administration. See Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, p. 130. This point was also reiterated at a series of meetings in 2008 with a senior advisor to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas based in Ramallah.
56. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State."
57. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different."
58. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror," Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1212659734963&pagename= JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
59. Ibid.
60.. Mohammed Abu Khadair, "Dr. Fayyad Places His Government at the Disposal of the President to Pave the Way for National Reconciliation," Al Quds, January 23, 2009.
61. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
62. Isabel Kirshner, "Volatile City Tests Palestinian Police and Peace Hopes," International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/14/africa/14nablus.php.
63. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
64. Moshe Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
65. A Nablus businessman told author Dan Diker of the direct threats made against him by local Nablus Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades commander Abu Jabber, in a meeting in Rome, December 9, 2009.
66. Steve Erlanger, "On Palestinian Question, Tough Choices for Obama," New York Times, January 22, 2009.
67. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas and the Palestinians," Hudson New York, January 2, 2009.
68. Mohammed Yaghi, "The Impact of the Gaza Conflict on Palestinian Politics," Policy Watch, No. 1446, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 31, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2978.
69. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
70. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: Abbas No Longer Heads PA," Jerusalem Post, January 9, 2009.
71. Tova Lazeroff and Yaakov Katz, "Israel Disputes Gaza Death Toll," Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2009.
72. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Al Aksa: We Also Fought IDF in Gaza," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
73. Akiva Eldar, "Report: EU to Lift Sanctions on Hamas if Palestinian Unity Government Formed," Ha'aretz, January 19, 2009.
74. http://tonyblairoffice.org/2009/01/gaza-ceasefire-must-be-followe.html.
75. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to ‘Steal' Gaza Funds."
76. Robert Satloff, "In the Wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America's ‘Grand Strategy' for the New Palestinian Authority," Policy Watch, No. 1252, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 26, 2007.
77. The notion of "bottom-up" peace-making based on broad Palestinian reform was coined by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon, and alluded to as a point of reference by Special Quartet Envoy Tony Blair. See http://tonyblairoffice.org/2008/05/towards-a-palestinian-state.html. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also referred to "bottom-up" peace-making in concert with his program of "economic peace" for the West Bank.
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Dan Diker is Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, where he is also a senior foreign policy analyst. He is also an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington. Khaled Abu Toameh is Palestinian affairs correspondent and analyst for the Jerusalem Post and a number of foreign TV stations and newspapers. They are currently co-authoring a book on the Middle East peace process.
What Hamas Wants
Original article
By MEMRI
MEMRI | Friday, January 30, 2009
Hamas Leaders: 'The Gaza Victory Has Paved the Way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank'; PA Should 'Join What Your People Has Chosen – Jihad and Resistance'; 'We Will Continue Fighting Until the Occupation is Defeated on Palestinian Soil'
Hamas officials, headed by Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mash'al, are contending that Hamas' victory in Gaza has paved the way to Jaffa and Haifa, and are calling on the Palestinian Authority to join the jihad and the resistance.
Following are excerpts from statements by Hamas leaders:
Mash'al: "The Resistance Entered Every Home, and Has Become an Ideal Among the Arab Nation and Worldwide"
"What happened in Gaza was the first real serious war [fought by] our people on their territory, and therefore it constitutes a turning point in the war with the Zionist enemy. The occupation has failed both politically and in the [battle]field, in that it was compelled, after three weeks, to stop the fighting unilaterally, with no agreement, binding conditions, or stipulations restricting the resistance.
"Two weeks prior to the ceasefire, the Zionist entity, through mediators, attempted to impose on us conditions of surrender, [i.e.] stopping the resistance in Gaza by [declaring] a long-term tahdia [calm] and disarming it.
"However, we staunchly held our ground both in the [battle]field and in the political arena. We rejected these conditions, and they were forced to stop their aggression, [admit] defeat, and withdraw unconditionally. We were adamant in our rejection [of these conditions], since we put our trust in our people's choices and rights…
"The enemy leaders wanted to achieve several objectives: to break the resistance, defeat it, and expel it from Gaza; [and] to inculcate our nation with defeatism, end Hamas's rule, and stop the firing of missiles. What was the outcome? The resistance showed fortitude and became an element equal to [the Israeli army], despite the difference in resources. The firing of missiles continued; our people rallied around the resistance and stood fast. Hamas, which [the Israelis] had set out to destroy, gained strength; the resistance has entered every home and has became an ideal among the Arab nation and worldwide."
"We Want an Intra-Palestinian Dialogue... But the Residents of the West Bank Must Rise Up and Resist... As Happened In Gaza"
Mash'al continued: "We were glad when the intra-Arab conciliation began, [although] it has not been achieved; [now] we seek an [intra-]Palestinian conciliation. However, having learned a lesson in Gaza, we want a conciliation based on the resistance and the rights, rather than on pointless negotiations, agreements, and conditions [set by] the Quartet. We want an intra-Palestinian dialogue - but in order to provide it with the proper basis, the residents of the West Bank must rise up and resist until victory, as happened in Gaza.
"This, however, will be possible only if the resistance fighters [i.e. Hamas members imprisoned by the PA in the West Bank] are set free and if the weapons of the resistance are regarded as legitimate and honored…
"As we won the Gaza war, so we will win a war aimed at lifting the siege and opening the crossings, as a preliminary to the liberation of the country, the return [of the refugees], the liberation of Jerusalem, and extricating ourselves from the occupation." [1]
Palestinian Factions "Creating New Supreme National Authority... The PLO No Longer Constitutes a Supreme Authority of the Palestinians"
At a rally marking the "Gaza victory" in Qatar, Mash'al said that the Palestinian factions were initiating a "surprising" move and were acting to "create a new supreme national authority, that will represent the Palestinians in [Palestine] and outside it, and will include all the national Palestinian forces and all the streams in the Palestinian people... In its present state, the PLO no longer constitutes a supreme authority of the Palestinians; instead, it has turned into an administration aimed at dividing the Palestinian home." [2]
Hamas Spokesman to PA: "Join What Your People Has Chosen - Jihad and Resistance"
At the rally, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum called on the PA: "Stand aside and catch your breath. You are exhausted and must rest, so that the people can rest [as well]. The equations have changed; victories have been achieved; all bets have failed. Enough! Time is not on your side, and the clock cannot be turned back. Join what your people has chosen - jihad and resistance." [3]
"The Gaza Victory Has Paved the Way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank... We Will Continue Fighting Until the Occupation is Defeated on Palestinian Soil"
Senior Hamas official Isma'il Radhwan stated at the rally: "The Gaza victory has paved the way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank. Gaza is not our [only] enterprise; [our national enterprise includes] Gaza and Palestine. We will continue fighting until the occupation is defeated on Palestinian soil." [4]
Mash'al to Europe: "You Should Be Ashamed... For Not Making It Possible For Us to Obtain Weapons... The Time Has Come For Reciprocal Relations With Hamas"
At the Qatar rally, Mash'al addressed Europe, saying: "You should be ashamed. It is a crime that you are cannot stop the aggression against us, and that you are not making it possible for us [to obtain] the weapons of the resistance. It will be a mark of disgrace on the forehead of Europe and the rest of the Western entities, if this policy continues…
"The time has come for reciprocal relations with Hamas, which has been legitimized both by the struggle and by the ballot box... [5]
Mash'al then addressed U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell, warning him against disregarding the resistance, and saying, "All political, security, and military efforts will fail if they are based on disregarding the resistance." [6]
_________________________________________________________
[1] www.palestine-info.info, January 21, 2009.
[2] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[3] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[4] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[6] Al-Sharq (Qatar), January 29, 2009.
By MEMRI
MEMRI | Friday, January 30, 2009
Hamas Leaders: 'The Gaza Victory Has Paved the Way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank'; PA Should 'Join What Your People Has Chosen – Jihad and Resistance'; 'We Will Continue Fighting Until the Occupation is Defeated on Palestinian Soil'
Hamas officials, headed by Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mash'al, are contending that Hamas' victory in Gaza has paved the way to Jaffa and Haifa, and are calling on the Palestinian Authority to join the jihad and the resistance.
Following are excerpts from statements by Hamas leaders:
Mash'al: "The Resistance Entered Every Home, and Has Become an Ideal Among the Arab Nation and Worldwide"
"What happened in Gaza was the first real serious war [fought by] our people on their territory, and therefore it constitutes a turning point in the war with the Zionist enemy. The occupation has failed both politically and in the [battle]field, in that it was compelled, after three weeks, to stop the fighting unilaterally, with no agreement, binding conditions, or stipulations restricting the resistance.
"Two weeks prior to the ceasefire, the Zionist entity, through mediators, attempted to impose on us conditions of surrender, [i.e.] stopping the resistance in Gaza by [declaring] a long-term tahdia [calm] and disarming it.
"However, we staunchly held our ground both in the [battle]field and in the political arena. We rejected these conditions, and they were forced to stop their aggression, [admit] defeat, and withdraw unconditionally. We were adamant in our rejection [of these conditions], since we put our trust in our people's choices and rights…
"The enemy leaders wanted to achieve several objectives: to break the resistance, defeat it, and expel it from Gaza; [and] to inculcate our nation with defeatism, end Hamas's rule, and stop the firing of missiles. What was the outcome? The resistance showed fortitude and became an element equal to [the Israeli army], despite the difference in resources. The firing of missiles continued; our people rallied around the resistance and stood fast. Hamas, which [the Israelis] had set out to destroy, gained strength; the resistance has entered every home and has became an ideal among the Arab nation and worldwide."
"We Want an Intra-Palestinian Dialogue... But the Residents of the West Bank Must Rise Up and Resist... As Happened In Gaza"
Mash'al continued: "We were glad when the intra-Arab conciliation began, [although] it has not been achieved; [now] we seek an [intra-]Palestinian conciliation. However, having learned a lesson in Gaza, we want a conciliation based on the resistance and the rights, rather than on pointless negotiations, agreements, and conditions [set by] the Quartet. We want an intra-Palestinian dialogue - but in order to provide it with the proper basis, the residents of the West Bank must rise up and resist until victory, as happened in Gaza.
"This, however, will be possible only if the resistance fighters [i.e. Hamas members imprisoned by the PA in the West Bank] are set free and if the weapons of the resistance are regarded as legitimate and honored…
"As we won the Gaza war, so we will win a war aimed at lifting the siege and opening the crossings, as a preliminary to the liberation of the country, the return [of the refugees], the liberation of Jerusalem, and extricating ourselves from the occupation." [1]
Palestinian Factions "Creating New Supreme National Authority... The PLO No Longer Constitutes a Supreme Authority of the Palestinians"
At a rally marking the "Gaza victory" in Qatar, Mash'al said that the Palestinian factions were initiating a "surprising" move and were acting to "create a new supreme national authority, that will represent the Palestinians in [Palestine] and outside it, and will include all the national Palestinian forces and all the streams in the Palestinian people... In its present state, the PLO no longer constitutes a supreme authority of the Palestinians; instead, it has turned into an administration aimed at dividing the Palestinian home." [2]
Hamas Spokesman to PA: "Join What Your People Has Chosen - Jihad and Resistance"
At the rally, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum called on the PA: "Stand aside and catch your breath. You are exhausted and must rest, so that the people can rest [as well]. The equations have changed; victories have been achieved; all bets have failed. Enough! Time is not on your side, and the clock cannot be turned back. Join what your people has chosen - jihad and resistance." [3]
"The Gaza Victory Has Paved the Way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank... We Will Continue Fighting Until the Occupation is Defeated on Palestinian Soil"
Senior Hamas official Isma'il Radhwan stated at the rally: "The Gaza victory has paved the way to Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, the Negev, and the West Bank. Gaza is not our [only] enterprise; [our national enterprise includes] Gaza and Palestine. We will continue fighting until the occupation is defeated on Palestinian soil." [4]
Mash'al to Europe: "You Should Be Ashamed... For Not Making It Possible For Us to Obtain Weapons... The Time Has Come For Reciprocal Relations With Hamas"
At the Qatar rally, Mash'al addressed Europe, saying: "You should be ashamed. It is a crime that you are cannot stop the aggression against us, and that you are not making it possible for us [to obtain] the weapons of the resistance. It will be a mark of disgrace on the forehead of Europe and the rest of the Western entities, if this policy continues…
"The time has come for reciprocal relations with Hamas, which has been legitimized both by the struggle and by the ballot box... [5]
Mash'al then addressed U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell, warning him against disregarding the resistance, and saying, "All political, security, and military efforts will fail if they are based on disregarding the resistance." [6]
_________________________________________________________
[1] www.palestine-info.info, January 21, 2009.
[2] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[3] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[4] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 21, 2009.
[6] Al-Sharq (Qatar), January 29, 2009.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Gaza victims describe human shield use
Original article
By JPOST STAFF
Members of a Gaza family whose farm was turned into a "fortress" by Hamas fighters have reported that they were helpless to stop Hamas from using them as human shields.
They told the official Palestinian Authority daily newspaper that for years Hamas had used their property and homes as military installations from which the group would launch rockets into Israel, dig tunnels and store arms. According to the victims, those who tried to object were shot in the legs by Hamas operatives.
Palestinian Media Watch quoted the official Palestinian Authority daily, Al-Hayat al-Jadida as reporting on January 27, "The Abd Rabbo family kept quiet while Hamas fighters turned their farm in the Gaza strip into a fortress. Right now they are waiting for the aid promised by the [Hamas] movement after Israel bombed the farm and turned it into ruins."
According to the report, the hill on which the Abd Rabbo family lives overlooks Sderot, making it an ideal military position for Hamas fighters.
The Abd Rabbo family members emphasized to the paper that they were not Hamas activists and that they were still loyal to the Fatah movement, but that they had been unable to prevent the armed squads from entering their neighborhood at night.
By JPOST STAFF
Members of a Gaza family whose farm was turned into a "fortress" by Hamas fighters have reported that they were helpless to stop Hamas from using them as human shields.
They told the official Palestinian Authority daily newspaper that for years Hamas had used their property and homes as military installations from which the group would launch rockets into Israel, dig tunnels and store arms. According to the victims, those who tried to object were shot in the legs by Hamas operatives.
Palestinian Media Watch quoted the official Palestinian Authority daily, Al-Hayat al-Jadida as reporting on January 27, "The Abd Rabbo family kept quiet while Hamas fighters turned their farm in the Gaza strip into a fortress. Right now they are waiting for the aid promised by the [Hamas] movement after Israel bombed the farm and turned it into ruins."
According to the report, the hill on which the Abd Rabbo family lives overlooks Sderot, making it an ideal military position for Hamas fighters.
The Abd Rabbo family members emphasized to the paper that they were not Hamas activists and that they were still loyal to the Fatah movement, but that they had been unable to prevent the armed squads from entering their neighborhood at night.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Top UN official blasts Hamas for 'cynical' use of civilian facilities
Original article
By Haaretz Service
Last update - 10:05 28/01/2009
United Nations Humanitarian Affairs Chief John Holmes blasted Hamas Tuesday for its "cynical" use of civilian facilities during recent hostilities in the Gaza Strip.
"The reckless and cynical use of civilian installations by Hamas and indiscriminate firing of rockets against civilian populations are clear violations of international humanitarian law," Holmes told the UN Security Council.
Israel came under harsh criticism from the UN for firing on its facilities during Operation Cast Lead. Israel says Palestinian gunmen used the facilities as bases from which to attack its troops. According to Palestinian sources, bombings of UN facilities killed nearly 50 people in Israel's three-week long offensive in the Gaza Strip.
Holmes added that Hamas must not interfere with the movement of humanitarian supplies and urged Israel to reopen the border crossings to allow large quantities of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.
"Israel has a particular responsibility as the occupying power in this context, because of its control of Gaza's borders with Israel, to respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law," he said.
By Haaretz Service
Last update - 10:05 28/01/2009
United Nations Humanitarian Affairs Chief John Holmes blasted Hamas Tuesday for its "cynical" use of civilian facilities during recent hostilities in the Gaza Strip.
"The reckless and cynical use of civilian installations by Hamas and indiscriminate firing of rockets against civilian populations are clear violations of international humanitarian law," Holmes told the UN Security Council.
Israel came under harsh criticism from the UN for firing on its facilities during Operation Cast Lead. Israel says Palestinian gunmen used the facilities as bases from which to attack its troops. According to Palestinian sources, bombings of UN facilities killed nearly 50 people in Israel's three-week long offensive in the Gaza Strip.
Holmes added that Hamas must not interfere with the movement of humanitarian supplies and urged Israel to reopen the border crossings to allow large quantities of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.
"Israel has a particular responsibility as the occupying power in this context, because of its control of Gaza's borders with Israel, to respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law," he said.
Report: UNRWA pays terrorists
In sharply worded report, former legal advisor to UN agency says group must redefine oxymoronic labeling of Palestinians with Jordanian, Lebanese citizenship as refugees
Original article
by Yitzhak Benhorin
Published: 01.28.09, 00:51 / Israel News
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees employs and provides benefits for terrorists and criminals, asserts a former legal adviser to UNRWA who left the organization in 2007. James Lindsay, now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, served as an attorney with the US Justice Department for two decades before leaving to work for UNRWA in 2000.
Titled 'Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees,' Lindsay's report puts forward suggestions intended to improve the agency. Established by the US and Britain after the 1948 war, UNRWA's objective was to aid displaced Palestinians.
Lindsay writes that although the US remains UNRWA's main contributor, the agency's positions contrast with Washington's.
During the recent fighting in Gaza a number of UNRWA institutions were bombed by the IDF, which claimed that terrorists had fired at forces from within or near the UN compounds. The agency's employees took a clear-cut stance against Israel during the war.
Lindsay's report warns that the agency has deteriorated increasingly over the years since its establishment, and that it was currently offering services to those who were not actually in need of them. "No justification exists for millions of dollars in humanitarian aid going to those who can afford to pay for UNRWA services," the report says.
He suggests UNRWA make operational changes and "halt its one-sided political statements and limit itself to comments on humanitarian issues; take additional steps to ensure the agency is not employing or providing benefits to terrorists and criminals; and allow the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), or some other neutral entity, to provide balanced and discrimination-free textbooks for UNRWA initiatives."
Lindsay concludes his report by saying that only these changes would allow the agency to complete its task in the Middle East. "For the Palestinians it serves, this means ending their refugee status and returning, after nearly sixty years, to what most of them so desperately seek: normal lives," he writes.
The report will be handed over to US President Barack Obama's administration, which is keen to help fix the ailing agency.
"The United States, despite funding nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s initial budget and remaining its largest single country donor, has largely failed to make UNRWA reflect US foreign policy objectives. UNRWA initially served US humanitarian purposes, but in later years often clashed with US policies," the report says.
Lindsay claims the most important change that should be made in the agency is "the removal of citizens from recognized states – persons who have the oxymoronic status of “citizen refugees” – from UNRWA’s jurisdiction. This would apply to the vast majority of Palestinian “refugees” in Jordan, as well as to some in Lebanon and Syria."
Original article
by Yitzhak Benhorin
Published: 01.28.09, 00:51 / Israel News
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees employs and provides benefits for terrorists and criminals, asserts a former legal adviser to UNRWA who left the organization in 2007. James Lindsay, now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, served as an attorney with the US Justice Department for two decades before leaving to work for UNRWA in 2000.
Titled 'Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees,' Lindsay's report puts forward suggestions intended to improve the agency. Established by the US and Britain after the 1948 war, UNRWA's objective was to aid displaced Palestinians.
Lindsay writes that although the US remains UNRWA's main contributor, the agency's positions contrast with Washington's.
During the recent fighting in Gaza a number of UNRWA institutions were bombed by the IDF, which claimed that terrorists had fired at forces from within or near the UN compounds. The agency's employees took a clear-cut stance against Israel during the war.
Lindsay's report warns that the agency has deteriorated increasingly over the years since its establishment, and that it was currently offering services to those who were not actually in need of them. "No justification exists for millions of dollars in humanitarian aid going to those who can afford to pay for UNRWA services," the report says.
He suggests UNRWA make operational changes and "halt its one-sided political statements and limit itself to comments on humanitarian issues; take additional steps to ensure the agency is not employing or providing benefits to terrorists and criminals; and allow the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), or some other neutral entity, to provide balanced and discrimination-free textbooks for UNRWA initiatives."
Lindsay concludes his report by saying that only these changes would allow the agency to complete its task in the Middle East. "For the Palestinians it serves, this means ending their refugee status and returning, after nearly sixty years, to what most of them so desperately seek: normal lives," he writes.
The report will be handed over to US President Barack Obama's administration, which is keen to help fix the ailing agency.
"The United States, despite funding nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s initial budget and remaining its largest single country donor, has largely failed to make UNRWA reflect US foreign policy objectives. UNRWA initially served US humanitarian purposes, but in later years often clashed with US policies," the report says.
Lindsay claims the most important change that should be made in the agency is "the removal of citizens from recognized states – persons who have the oxymoronic status of “citizen refugees” – from UNRWA’s jurisdiction. This would apply to the vast majority of Palestinian “refugees” in Jordan, as well as to some in Lebanon and Syria."
Hamas captives talk to Shin Bet about tactics and training
Original article
By Amos Harel, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 02:10 28/01/2009
The Shin Bet security service released details Tuesday regarding its interrogation of two Hamas men who were arrested by the Israel Defense Forces during the Gaza military campaign, including the militants' use of mosques for weapon caches and military training.
There are more than 20 terrorists currently being held in Israel from the Gaza operation.
One of those is Ramzi Abed-Rabo, a 30-year-old Hamas member from Jabalya. The Shin Bet indicated he admitted under questioning that he used to watch IDF movements from his house and report about them to Hamas. He also told his interrogators about the location of Hamas weapon storage sites, in tunnels, in the homes of activists, and in citrus groves and mosques.
Another Hamas member, Subahi Atar, 27, from the village of al-Atatra in the northern Gaza Strip, told interrogators that he was a member of a Hamas security cell in the area around his village.
He was recruited by the military wing of Hamas two and a half years ago and underwent training in handling weapons, firing rockets and preparing explosive charges.
Last year, he also learned to use anti-tank missiles. Atar said that his theory instruction took place at a mosque in his village. He reportedly also admitted to helping dig a tunnel under a building which was used by the internal security service of Hamas.
Dozens of other Gazans were released and returned to the Gaza Strip after brief interrogations.
By Amos Harel, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 02:10 28/01/2009
The Shin Bet security service released details Tuesday regarding its interrogation of two Hamas men who were arrested by the Israel Defense Forces during the Gaza military campaign, including the militants' use of mosques for weapon caches and military training.
There are more than 20 terrorists currently being held in Israel from the Gaza operation.
One of those is Ramzi Abed-Rabo, a 30-year-old Hamas member from Jabalya. The Shin Bet indicated he admitted under questioning that he used to watch IDF movements from his house and report about them to Hamas. He also told his interrogators about the location of Hamas weapon storage sites, in tunnels, in the homes of activists, and in citrus groves and mosques.
Another Hamas member, Subahi Atar, 27, from the village of al-Atatra in the northern Gaza Strip, told interrogators that he was a member of a Hamas security cell in the area around his village.
He was recruited by the military wing of Hamas two and a half years ago and underwent training in handling weapons, firing rockets and preparing explosive charges.
Last year, he also learned to use anti-tank missiles. Atar said that his theory instruction took place at a mosque in his village. He reportedly also admitted to helping dig a tunnel under a building which was used by the internal security service of Hamas.
Dozens of other Gazans were released and returned to the Gaza Strip after brief interrogations.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Hamas executes former B'tselem field worker
Original article
by Khaled Abu Toameh
Jan 25, 2009 1:28 | Updated Jan 25, 2009 10:42
A Palestinian human rights activist and journalist who used to work for the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem has been executed by Hamas on charges of "collaboration" with Israel, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip said over the weekend.
They identified the man as Haidar Ghanem, 46, of Rafah.
They pointed out that Ghanem, who was a field researcher for B'Tselem, had been sentenced to death by a Palestinian Authority court in 2002 after being found guilty of passing on information to Israel that later resulted in the elimination of Fatah gunmen.
Ghanem, according to the Palestinians, was among dozens of suspected "collaborators" who were executed by Hamas during Operation Cast Lead.
Fatah officials in Ramallah claimed that many of the alleged collaborators were in fact Fatah members who had been rounded up by Hamas militiamen during the war. They said that Ghanem was executed on January 7 in Rafah.
Although he was sentenced to death by firing squad seven years ago, former PA Chairman Yasser Arafat and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, refrained from carrying out the sentence because of pressure from human rights groups and journalists.
The PA state security court had sentenced Ghanem, a father of two, after holding only two brief sessions. He was convicted of helping Israel kill four Fatah activists in Rafah.
Ghanem pleaded guilty to collaborating, but denied responsibility for the killings. He told the court that he did not know that Israel would use the information to kill the activists.
Prosecutor Wael Zakut told the court Ghanem was recruited as an informer in 1996. He said he had been asked to monitor the movements of Fatah members Jamal Abdel Razek, Awni Dahir, Sami Abu Laban, and Nael Liddawi.
The prosecutor claimed the IDF killed them 15 minutes after Ghanem tipped off the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) about the location of their car. An undercover IDF unit intercepted the car, killing all four, he added.
The court was told by PA security officers that the accused had opened a press office in Rafah that was supplying the Shin Bet with information about Fatah activists. Ghanem was paid a monthly sum for his "press services."
The officers claimed that Ghanem had supplied Israel with reports on the movements of PA security personnel and names of Palestinians involved in terror attacks. Among other things, Ghanem prepared reports on the general mood in the Gaza Strip, the status of the PA, and details on the salaries of its employees.
The officer told the court that Ghanem's Shin Bet handlers had given him permission to work as a field researcher with B'Tselem to facilitate his mission and provide a cover for his espionage activities.
Ghanem told the court that he had confessed of his own free will because he had hoped to work as a double agent. He admitted that he had served as an informer, but said he did not watch the movements of the Fatah fugitives with the purpose of killing them.
by Khaled Abu Toameh
Jan 25, 2009 1:28 | Updated Jan 25, 2009 10:42
A Palestinian human rights activist and journalist who used to work for the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem has been executed by Hamas on charges of "collaboration" with Israel, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip said over the weekend.
They identified the man as Haidar Ghanem, 46, of Rafah.
They pointed out that Ghanem, who was a field researcher for B'Tselem, had been sentenced to death by a Palestinian Authority court in 2002 after being found guilty of passing on information to Israel that later resulted in the elimination of Fatah gunmen.
Ghanem, according to the Palestinians, was among dozens of suspected "collaborators" who were executed by Hamas during Operation Cast Lead.
Fatah officials in Ramallah claimed that many of the alleged collaborators were in fact Fatah members who had been rounded up by Hamas militiamen during the war. They said that Ghanem was executed on January 7 in Rafah.
Although he was sentenced to death by firing squad seven years ago, former PA Chairman Yasser Arafat and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, refrained from carrying out the sentence because of pressure from human rights groups and journalists.
The PA state security court had sentenced Ghanem, a father of two, after holding only two brief sessions. He was convicted of helping Israel kill four Fatah activists in Rafah.
Ghanem pleaded guilty to collaborating, but denied responsibility for the killings. He told the court that he did not know that Israel would use the information to kill the activists.
Prosecutor Wael Zakut told the court Ghanem was recruited as an informer in 1996. He said he had been asked to monitor the movements of Fatah members Jamal Abdel Razek, Awni Dahir, Sami Abu Laban, and Nael Liddawi.
The prosecutor claimed the IDF killed them 15 minutes after Ghanem tipped off the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) about the location of their car. An undercover IDF unit intercepted the car, killing all four, he added.
The court was told by PA security officers that the accused had opened a press office in Rafah that was supplying the Shin Bet with information about Fatah activists. Ghanem was paid a monthly sum for his "press services."
The officers claimed that Ghanem had supplied Israel with reports on the movements of PA security personnel and names of Palestinians involved in terror attacks. Among other things, Ghanem prepared reports on the general mood in the Gaza Strip, the status of the PA, and details on the salaries of its employees.
The officer told the court that Ghanem's Shin Bet handlers had given him permission to work as a field researcher with B'Tselem to facilitate his mission and provide a cover for his espionage activities.
Ghanem told the court that he had confessed of his own free will because he had hoped to work as a double agent. He admitted that he had served as an informer, but said he did not watch the movements of the Fatah fugitives with the purpose of killing them.
Top Defense Ministry official: Egypt sees Hamas as 'national enemy'
Original article
By Haaretz Service and Reuters
Last update - 16:45 27/01/2009
Senior Defense Ministry official Amos Gilad said on Tuesday that Egypt views Hamas as a national enemy and a threat to its regime, and is now more willing than ever to fight against the ongoing smuggling of arms into the Gaza Strip.
"Egypt demonstrated extreme tolerance toward the Israel Defense Forces' activities [in Gaza]," said Gilad, who is Israel's top negotiating official on matters with Egypt. "Even today, Egypt is being very strict on Hamas and is not prepared to give the group anything - [including] the opening of the Rafah border crossing.
Gilad said that Egypt's determination against smuggling was unprecedented, saying even the international community has never demonstrated such willingness to curb the illegal flow of arms.
Gilad said it remained to be seen whether these intentions would pan out, but he was optimistic that Israel and Egypt were on the same page regarding the smuggling threats..
"All of the understandings that Israel has forged with Egypt following the operation have a created a good basis," he said. "We will act directly with Egypt and make use of international forces."
"An attack like the one today will bring a response from Israel much larger than just closing border crossings and Hamas knows that. It is not in its interest to attack Israel.
Egypt warns EU against sending ships to patrol Gaza coast
Egypt warned European countries earlier Tuesday to think carefully before sending ships to patrol Gaza's coastal waters to prevent arms smuggling, saying such a move could have significant consequences on ties with Arab states.
The warning by Egypt Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit came after Britain, France and Germany offered to send warships to the Middle East to monitor and prevent arms smuggling to Gaza and to help consolidate a shaky ceasefire.
"In my discussions with European foreign ministers yesterday, I warned them and said: 'You must understand Arab and Muslim feelings,'" Aboul Gheit told a news conference, adding that if such a job was needed, the responsibility should be borne by Israel, not Europe.
"I urge you to look and consider this ... because it might have consequences in Palestinian and Arab relations with you," Aboul Gheit said, speaking after talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
The three European Union countries have sent a joint letter to the Israeli and Egyptian governments outlining their offer of naval support, according to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. They are also willing to help monitor border crossings in Gaza.
European officials stress their scope for action is limited while Cairo refuses to have a foreign presence on its soil to monitor the Egyptian end of a network of tunnels bringing in supplies - including arms, according to Israel - to Gaza.
Egypt, much criticised in the Arab world for cooperating in the Israeli blockade of Gaza over the past six months, has long been loath to allow any access by foreign troops to its own territory, fearing infringement on its sovereignty.
Aboul Gheit said earlier this month that Egypt would also not allow U.S. vessels to enter Egyptian waters to carry out anti-smuggling operations, and that any such operations should take place on the high seas.
That was after Washington and Israel signed a pact aimed at stopping smuggling that included technical assistance and the use of U.S. "assets" to prevent arms from reaching Hamas by air, land or sea, as well as deployment of vessels from NATO countries to prevent maritime smuggling.
France said on Friday it was sending a frigate carrying helicopters to patrol international waters off the Gaza coast as part of efforts to consolidate the ceasefire.
A statement from French President Nicolas Sarkozy's office said the surveillance, aimed at preventing arms trafficking by sea to Hamas-ruled Gaza, would be carried out in full cooperation with Egypt and Israel.
By Haaretz Service and Reuters
Last update - 16:45 27/01/2009
Senior Defense Ministry official Amos Gilad said on Tuesday that Egypt views Hamas as a national enemy and a threat to its regime, and is now more willing than ever to fight against the ongoing smuggling of arms into the Gaza Strip.
"Egypt demonstrated extreme tolerance toward the Israel Defense Forces' activities [in Gaza]," said Gilad, who is Israel's top negotiating official on matters with Egypt. "Even today, Egypt is being very strict on Hamas and is not prepared to give the group anything - [including] the opening of the Rafah border crossing.
Gilad said that Egypt's determination against smuggling was unprecedented, saying even the international community has never demonstrated such willingness to curb the illegal flow of arms.
Gilad said it remained to be seen whether these intentions would pan out, but he was optimistic that Israel and Egypt were on the same page regarding the smuggling threats..
"All of the understandings that Israel has forged with Egypt following the operation have a created a good basis," he said. "We will act directly with Egypt and make use of international forces."
"An attack like the one today will bring a response from Israel much larger than just closing border crossings and Hamas knows that. It is not in its interest to attack Israel.
Egypt warns EU against sending ships to patrol Gaza coast
Egypt warned European countries earlier Tuesday to think carefully before sending ships to patrol Gaza's coastal waters to prevent arms smuggling, saying such a move could have significant consequences on ties with Arab states.
The warning by Egypt Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit came after Britain, France and Germany offered to send warships to the Middle East to monitor and prevent arms smuggling to Gaza and to help consolidate a shaky ceasefire.
"In my discussions with European foreign ministers yesterday, I warned them and said: 'You must understand Arab and Muslim feelings,'" Aboul Gheit told a news conference, adding that if such a job was needed, the responsibility should be borne by Israel, not Europe.
"I urge you to look and consider this ... because it might have consequences in Palestinian and Arab relations with you," Aboul Gheit said, speaking after talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
The three European Union countries have sent a joint letter to the Israeli and Egyptian governments outlining their offer of naval support, according to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. They are also willing to help monitor border crossings in Gaza.
European officials stress their scope for action is limited while Cairo refuses to have a foreign presence on its soil to monitor the Egyptian end of a network of tunnels bringing in supplies - including arms, according to Israel - to Gaza.
Egypt, much criticised in the Arab world for cooperating in the Israeli blockade of Gaza over the past six months, has long been loath to allow any access by foreign troops to its own territory, fearing infringement on its sovereignty.
Aboul Gheit said earlier this month that Egypt would also not allow U.S. vessels to enter Egyptian waters to carry out anti-smuggling operations, and that any such operations should take place on the high seas.
That was after Washington and Israel signed a pact aimed at stopping smuggling that included technical assistance and the use of U.S. "assets" to prevent arms from reaching Hamas by air, land or sea, as well as deployment of vessels from NATO countries to prevent maritime smuggling.
France said on Friday it was sending a frigate carrying helicopters to patrol international waters off the Gaza coast as part of efforts to consolidate the ceasefire.
A statement from French President Nicolas Sarkozy's office said the surveillance, aimed at preventing arms trafficking by sea to Hamas-ruled Gaza, would be carried out in full cooperation with Egypt and Israel.
Iranian reformist daily: Hamas hiding forces in nurseries and hospitals
Original article
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Jan. 1, 2009
An Iranian reformist daily newspaper has criticized Hamas "for risking lives of civilians, amongst them children, by hiding its forces in nurseries and hospitals." This is reported in today's Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam. The Palestinian daily adds that in response the Iranian government has closed the newspaper.
The following is the story in today's Al-Ayyam:
Headline: "Iran closes a reformist newspaper, for publishing a report criticizing Hamas"
"The Iranian news agency "Irna" reported yesterday, that the Iranian Culture Ministry has closed the reformist daily newspaper "Karjo Zaran", because it published a report that included criticism of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).
On December 30 the paper published a statement of a reformist student organization, that has criticized Hamas for risking lives of civilians, amongst them children, by hiding its forces in nurseries and hospitals. The statement was published whilst the Iranian government expresses a unified stands against Israel, and Tehran is overwhelmed by demonstrations against Israel."
[Al-Ayyam, Jan. 1, 2009]
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Jan. 1, 2009
An Iranian reformist daily newspaper has criticized Hamas "for risking lives of civilians, amongst them children, by hiding its forces in nurseries and hospitals." This is reported in today's Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam. The Palestinian daily adds that in response the Iranian government has closed the newspaper.
The following is the story in today's Al-Ayyam:
Headline: "Iran closes a reformist newspaper, for publishing a report criticizing Hamas"
"The Iranian news agency "Irna" reported yesterday, that the Iranian Culture Ministry has closed the reformist daily newspaper "Karjo Zaran", because it published a report that included criticism of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).
On December 30 the paper published a statement of a reformist student organization, that has criticized Hamas for risking lives of civilians, amongst them children, by hiding its forces in nurseries and hospitals. The statement was published whilst the Iranian government expresses a unified stands against Israel, and Tehran is overwhelmed by demonstrations against Israel."
[Al-Ayyam, Jan. 1, 2009]
A Palestinian girl whose family members were killed yesterday in Gaza:
Original article
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Dec. 29, 2008
A Palestinian girl whose family members was killed yesterday in Gaza after an Israeli air attack was interviewed today on Palestinian TV and placed the blame for the war on Hamas:
[Girl] "We were sleeping 7 girls in the room. We were asleep and didn't know what was happening. In the morning all the bricks were on top of my head, and the heads of all my sisters. My 4 year old sister next to me was dead."
[Interviewer] "How many were you?"
[Girl] "Seven.In the other room were my mother, my father, my yonger brother and another sister, who is 13 days old. I say, Hamas is the cause, in the first place, of all wars."
[PATV (Fatah) Dec. 29, 2008]
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Dec. 29, 2008
A Palestinian girl whose family members was killed yesterday in Gaza after an Israeli air attack was interviewed today on Palestinian TV and placed the blame for the war on Hamas:
[Girl] "We were sleeping 7 girls in the room. We were asleep and didn't know what was happening. In the morning all the bricks were on top of my head, and the heads of all my sisters. My 4 year old sister next to me was dead."
[Interviewer] "How many were you?"
[Girl] "Seven.In the other room were my mother, my father, my yonger brother and another sister, who is 13 days old. I say, Hamas is the cause, in the first place, of all wars."
[PATV (Fatah) Dec. 29, 2008]
Hamas using children in combat support roles
Original article
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Jan. 13, 2009
A child in Gaza describes how he and other children are being used in combat support roles for Hamas fighters. According to the Palestinian child, children are being used as scouts to follow Israeli movements, and as couriers to supply ammunition and deliver information to the Hamas fighters.
The following is the description of the children's combat support roles, quoted in an Israeli Arab weekly:
by Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Jan. 13, 2009
A child in Gaza describes how he and other children are being used in combat support roles for Hamas fighters. According to the Palestinian child, children are being used as scouts to follow Israeli movements, and as couriers to supply ammunition and deliver information to the Hamas fighters.
The following is the description of the children's combat support roles, quoted in an Israeli Arab weekly:
"[The newspaper] Kul Al-Arab called many Gaza Strip residents, to comprehend the situation of the people who are suffering for two weeks from the wild Israeli aggression...
Khaled, from A-Rimal [in Gaza], said: 'We the children, in small groups and in civilian clothes, are fulfilling missions of support for the [Hamas] Resistance fighters, by transmitting messages about the movements of the enemy forces, or by bringing them ammunition and food. We ourselves are not aware of the movements of the Resistance fighters. We see them in one place, they suddenly disappear, and then reappear somewhere else. They are like ghosts, it is very hard to find them or hurt them.'"
[Kul-Al-Arab (Israeli Arab weekly), January 9, 2009]
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